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Abstract
Chu Spaces and Channel Theory are well established areas of investigation in the general
context of category theory. We review a range of examples and applications of these meth-
ods in logic and computer science, including Formal Concept Analysis, distributed systems and
ontology development. We then employ these methods to describe human object perception,
beginning with the construction of uncategorized object files and proceeding through catego-
rization, individual object identification and the tracking of object identity through time. We
investigate the relationship between abstraction and mereological categorization, particularly as
these affect object identity tracking. This we accomplish in terms of information flow that is se-
mantically structured in terms of local logics, while at the same time this framework also provides
an inferential mechanism towards identification and perception. We show how a mereotopology
naturally emerges from the representation of classifications by simplicial complexes, and briefly
explore the emergence of geometric relations and interactions between objects.
Keywords: Chu space, Information Channel, Infomorphism, Formal Concept Analysis, Dis-
tributed System, Event File, Ontology, Mereological Complexity, Colimit.
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1 Introduction
Category theory provides a language and a range of conceptual tools towards the general study
of complexity, originally in a mathematical framework, and later applied extensively to computer
science, artificial intelligence, the life sciences, and the study of ontologies (reviewed by Baianu et
al. (2006); Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch (2007); Goguen (2005a,b); Healy and Caudell (2006);
Healy (2010); Poli (2001, 2006); Rosen (1986)). This follows a tradition in conceiving of a range
of descriptive methods in analytical philosophy as first advocated by F. Brentano (1981) and then
later by E. Husserl (1970), and others (surveyed by e.g. Simons (1987); Smith (2003)).
One particular categorical concept is that of a Chu space, which entered computer science as
a representable model of linear logic originally formulated by Barr (1979, 1991) and Seely (1989).
An advantage of using Chu spaces is their flexibility in adapting to a wide range of interpretations
and applications. They are more general than topological spaces, and they can be represented in
straightforward object-attribute rectangular/matrix-like arrays (the rows consisting of object names,
and the columns consisting of attribute names; so an [ij]-entry simply means that an object oi has
an attribute aj). From the observational perspective, the attributes are taken to provide informa-
tion about the structural and dynamical configurations of, and between objects. Following earlier
developments of the theory, Chu spaces emerged with importance in areas dealing with machine
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learning and data mining; these include (but are not limited to) parallel programming algorithms,
information retrieval, concurrent computation automata, physical systems, local logics, formal con-
cept analysis (see below), the semantics of observation-measurement problems, decision theory, and
ontological engineering (Abramsky, 2012; Allwein, Yang and Harrison, 2011; Barr, 1979; Barwise
and Seligman, 1997; Berners-Lee, Hendler and Lassila, 2001; Pratt, 1995, 1999a,b; Zhang and Shen,
2006). Accordingly, one may find a variety of interpretations of Chu-space representations, includ-
ing the object/attribute criteria used to define informational relationships, depending on the chosen
context.
During information processing, the various channels of information assimilation may possess
intrinsic qualities that influence the type of inferences they derive from the basic premise that “X
being A carries the information that Y is B” (Dretske, 1981). As a step towards conceptualizing
information flow within a logical environment in category-theoretic terms, the basic elements of
Chu spaces have been adapted to the concept of Classifications, as the latter are expressed in
terms of Tokens and Types (Barwise and Seligman, 1997; Barwise, 1997, 1986; Barwise and Perry,
1983). The resulting framework of Channel Theory casts information flow within a logical and
distributed systems environment. An infomorphism, as a reformulated Chu morphism (in a sense
‘dual’) constitutes a pivotal concept of Channel Theory, by defining a channel through which the
information represented by one classification is re-represented in another.
We have two broad aims in this paper: 1) to assemble the main concepts and tools of Chu
spaces and Channel Theory in one place, and briefly review some of their applications, and 2) to
apply these concepts and tools to develop category-theoretic descriptions of three interdependent
cognitive processes, the construction of object files (Kahneman, Triesman and Gibbs, 1992) and
object tokens (Zimmer and Ecker, 2010), the binding of type and token information in object cate-
gorization (Martin, 2007; Keifer and Pulvermu¨ller, 2012), and the recognition and categorization of
mereologically-complex individuals. While the notion of “entry-level” categories and the extension
of such categories both upward and downward in an abstraction (or type) hierarchy has been inten-
sively investigated both experimentally (Clarke and Tyler, 2015) and theoretically (Sowa (2006);
see also §9 below), the representation of mereological complexity has received far less attention.
Mereological categorization can be functionally dissociated from abstraction-based categorization
in humans, e.g. in high-functioning autism where “weak central coherence”, and hence deficit
understanding of mereological complexity may be displayed alongside normal or even superior ab-
straction ability (Happe´ and Frith, 2006; Booth and Happe´, 2016). How abstraction-based types
and mereological types are related, and how their implementations in humans are related, thus re-
main to be worked out. We are also interested in how tokens representing individual, re-identifiable
objects, i.e. object tokens as discussed in §10.2, are able to participate both as such and as instances
of classified types in both hierarchies simultaneously. How, for example, can an object token rep-
resenting a particular dog be both an instance of the entry-level category [dog], as well as more
abstract categories such as [mammal] or [animal], while at the same time being represented as both
an individual entity with mereological complexity at multiple scales and as a proper component of
even more complex entities? As both abstraction and mereology contribute to the construction of
prior probabilities and to the regulation of precision or attention within Bayesian classifiers (Friston,
2010), the question of how these representations interact – from an implementation perspective,
how they cross-modulate each other – is crucial to understanding both how mereologically complex
objects are identified as individual entities and how identifiable individual entities are recognized
as being mereologically complex.
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The first part of the paper addresses the initial aim of the tool assembly. We begin by defining
and reviewing some of the basic properties of Chu spaces in §2. Although Chu spaces have been
traditionally applied to fields such as those listed above, they also have a number of other signif-
icant applications of interest here. How Chu spaces can be implemented within Formal Concept
Analysis and Domain Theory (e.g. to represent information systems and approximable concepts
following Hitzler and Zhang (2004); Kro¨tzsch, Hitzler and Zhang (2005); Scott (1982); Zhang and
Shen (2006)) is reviewed in §3. In §4 we discuss representations of spaces (and representations
by spaces), spatial coarse-graining and finite sampling of information (Gratus and Porter, 2006;
Sorkin, 1991a); we then review the representation of sampled information by simplicial complexes
constructed “above” the sampled space in §5. The following two sections, §6 and §7 establish a
similar working account of Channel Theory. We survey a number of motivating examples and
applications, including Distributed Systems (Barwise and Seligman, 1997) in §7.2, Cognizance
Classification (Sakahara and Sato, 2008, 2011) in §7.4, and the flow of information in Ontology
Comparison and Alignment (Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer, 2004; Schorlemmer, 2002, 2005) in §7.3.
The category-theoretic concepts of cocone and colimit (e.g. Awodey (2010)) naturally arise in
both Chu space and Channel Theory descriptions; we review these concepts in §8 with illustrative
examples.
The second part of the paper presents new results. We begin in §9 with brief reviews of
perception, categorization and attention as neurocognitive processes and of multi-layer recurrent
network models (e.g. Friston (2010); Grossberg (2013)) of these processes. In §10, we re-describe
perception and categorization, using the Chu space and Channel Theory tools assembled in the first
part, in a way that makes explicit the dualities between dynamic and static properties, individuals
and categories, and states and events. We capture these dualities in a “cone-cocone diagram” that
formalizes the inferential steps required to link object tokens together to produce a “history” of a
persistent object. We then turn our attention, in §11, to mereological categorization and to the key
mereotopological question of how the boundaries between the components of a complex object are
defined. As scenes are themselves mereological complexes, the boundary construction required for
object segmentation emerges as the simplest case of inter-object boundary definition.
Category theory is in essence a theory of dualities. Applying the tools of Chu spaces and
Channel Theory to cognition, and in particular to object identification, emphasizes the role of
concepts and processes representable as category-theoretic duals in cognitive processing. The roles
of complementary information flows at all scales, from on-center/off-surround networks to the dorsal
and ventral attention systems to the interplay of memory and prediction that constructs object
histories, exemplify such duality. By taking object identities and object persistence for granted,
AI systems have largely neglected the problem of object re-identification that lies at the heart of
the frame problem (Fields, 2013, 2016). Taking this problem and the dual organization required
to solve it into account suggests reconceptualizations of learning and memory as overarching dual
processes.
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Part I: Category-theoretic Concepts and Tools
2 Chu spaces and Chu transforms
2.1 Basic definitions for objects and attributes
Definition 2.1. A (dyadic or two-valued) Chu space C consists of a triple (Co,C, Ca) where
Co is a set of objects, Ca is a set of attributes, along with a satisfaction relation (or evaluation)
C⊆ Co × Ca.
For observational purposes, we may regard the “attributes” as providing information about
the structural and dynamical configurations of and between the “objects.” Two objects can be
distinguished if but only if there is at least one attribute that they do not share. Otherwise,
objects are said to be equivalent. This sense of equivalence formalizes Leibniz’ principle of ”identity
of indiscernibles.” The “objects” and “attributes” can equally well be thought of as “states” and
“events,” with “states” distinguished by the “events” that can occur in them or, as we will see, in
terms of “tokens” and “types” or other similar pairs of concepts.
Definition 2.2. A morphism or Chu transform of a Chu space C = (Co,C, Ca) to a Chu space
D = (Do,D, Da) is a pair of functions (fa, fo) with fo : Co −→ Do, and fa : Da −→ Ca, such that
for any x ∈ Co, and y ∈ Da, we have fo(x) D y, if and only if x C fa(y).
If C = (Co,C, Ca) is a Chu space, then C⊥ = (Ca,opC , Co) is the dual space of C in which
the roles of objects and attributes are interchanged. This sense of duality allows us to think,
for example, of attributes being distinguished by the objects to which they apply, events being
distinguished by the states in which they participate, or types being distinguished by the tokens
they include. Chu-space duality will provide, in §10, the key to representing recurrent networks in
a fully-symmetric way.
Remark 2.1. More generally, for some set K, we could also speak of a K-valued Chu space C =
(Co,C, Ca) with a satisfaction relation (evaluation) C: Co ×Ca −→ K, with relation C (a, b) an
element of K.
2.2 Chu flows
What is the information preserved when switching between Chu spaces that are tied by a Chu
transform? Let a Chu flow (van Benthem, 2000), cf. Barwise and Seligman (1997) be specified by
a “flow formula” constructed from the elements of the following schema:
x  a | ¬(x  a) | ∧ | ∨ | ∃x | ∀a. (2.1)
Any such formula ψ(a1, . . . , ak, x1, . . . , xm) specifies which objects xi have which attributes ai
in the Chu space in which it applies. van Benthem (2000) has shown that for finite Chu spaces
C and D, the existence of a Chu transform C −→ D is equivalent to every flow formula valid in C
being valid in D as well. The transform C −→ D can, in this case, be viewed as “transporting”
the information encoded in valid flow formulas from C to D; it can thus be thought of informally
as a “channel” from C to D and as implicitly providing a sense of “spatial” and/or “temporal”
separation between C and D. These informal notions will be made more precise in §6.
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Example 2.1. A given flow formula ψ(a1, . . . , ak, x1, . . . , xm) can give rise to useful relations
between k objects and m types. For instance (van Benthem, 2000):
∀x(¬a1 ∈ x ∧ a2 ∈ x) ⊂ object inclusion,
∀x(¬a1 ∈ x ∨ a2 ∈ x)  object incompatibility,
∃a(a ∈ x1 ∧ a ∈ x2) o type overlap.
2.3 Biextensional collapse
Following Pratt (1999a) we define a pair of maps relative to power sets P(·) as follows:
αˆ : Co −→ P(Ca) with αˆ(x) = {a ∈ Ca : x C a}
ωˆ : Ca −→ P(Co) with ωˆ(a) = {x ∈ Co : x C a}.
(2.2)
Given X ⊆ Co, and A ⊆ Ca, the above two maps extend to the following maps, respectively Zhang
and Shen (2006):
α : P(Co) −→ P(Ca) with α(x) = {a : ∀x ∈ X x C a}
ω : P(Ca) −→ P(Co) with ω(A) = {x : ∀a ∈ A x C a}.
(2.3)
A Chu space C is said to be extensional if ωˆ is injective, and separable if αˆ is injective. If C is
both extensional and separable, then let us say it is biextensional. In fact, any Chu space can be
turned into a biextensional type, provided the lack of injectivity of α and ω can be factored out in
a suitable sense. This creates a biextensional collapse of a Chu space C = (Co,C, Ca), namely the
Chu space
Ĉ = (Ĉo,Ĉ, Ĉa) = (αˆ(Co),Ĉ, ωˆ(Ca)), (2.4)
where αˆ(x) 
Ĉ
ωˆ(a), if and only if x C a. In essence this means that in the biextensional collapse
any repetitions in the rows of objects (tokens) and columns of attributes (types) are factored out,
thus removing unnecessary repetitions in the content of information and hence minimizing the
amount of processing units in a given algorithm.
3 Formal Concept Analysis and Computation in Chu spaces
Category theory can be viewed as a unified language for handling conceptual complexities in both
mathematics and computer science. Chu spaces and Chu flows provide a natural way of representing
both the structure and processing of information and have been used to investigate the semantic
foundations and design of data structures and programming languages. The examples that follow
illustrate these applications and introduce concepts that will prove useful later.
3.1 Concept lattices and approximable concepts
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) is an approach to the semantics of symbolic data structures that
studies the clustering of attributes into partially ordered sets that give rise to a concept lattice (Gan-
ter, Wille and Franzke, 1999). Domain Theory (DT) for programming languages is concerned with
higher-order relations between concepts that involve partial information and successive approxi-
mation, and with the question of when information can be approximated by finitely representable
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approximable concepts (Zhang and Shen, 2006) (cf. formal contexts described in Hitzler and Zhang
(2004)). A central idea of FCA is the distinction between the ‘extension’ of a concept as consisting
of all objects belonging to that concept, and the ‘intension’ of the concept as consisting of all at-
tributes common to all objects belonging to that concept. Defining a concept in FCA thus involves
identifying a collection of attributes which agrees with the ‘intension of the extension’. Note that
the idea of ‘intension’ in FCA captures the philosophical notion of an “essential property” that all
members (here, objects) of a category (here, a concept) must have.
This FCA notion of ‘concept’ has been shown to be intrinsic to a Chu space (Kro¨tzsch, Hitzler
and Zhang, 2005; Zhang and Shen, 2006); indeed each Chu space C = (Co,C, Ca) has an associated
complete lattice LC of formal concepts associated with C. Zhang and Shen (2006, Th. 4.1) have
further shown that for every complete lattice D of formal (in the sense of FCA) concepts, there is a
Chu space C such that D is order-isomorphic to LC. The following definition(s) then characterize
the differences between ‘formal’ (in the sense of FCA) and ‘approximable’ (in the sense of DT)
concepts.
Let P,Q be sets, and A ⊆ P(P ), B ⊆ P(Q) (recall that P(·) denotes the power set). Any pair
of functions s : A −→ B, t : B −→ A, is called a Galois connection, if for each X ∈ A and Y ∈ B,
s(X) ⊇ Y if and only if X ⊆ t(Y ). With respect to a Chu space C = (Co,C, Ca), we recall from
(2.3) the two associated functions (depending on C, so α = αC and ω = ωC ):
α : P(Co) −→ P(Ca) with α(x) = {a : ∀x ∈ X x C a}
ω : P(Ca) −→ P(Co) with ω(A) = {x : ∀a ∈ A x C a}.
(3.1)
The pair of maps (α, ω) forms such a Galois connection (Ganter, Wille and Franzke, 1999): i)
the set of attribute (object) concepts of P forms a closure system, i.e. a family of subsets closed
under intersection (Caspard and Monjardet, 2003); the attribute (object) concepts of C under set
inclusion form a complete lattice; and, iii) the lattice of attribute concepts, and the lattice of object
concepts are anti-isomorphic to each other. We then have:
Definition 3.1.
(1) A subset A ⊆ Ca is called an (formal) concept (of attributes), if it is a fixed point of α ◦ ω,
i.e. α(ω(A)) = A. Dually, a subset X ⊆ Co is called a (formal) concept (of objects) if it is a
fixed point of ω ◦ α. For each object x ∈ Co, the set of its attributes α{x} is a concept.
(2) A subset A ⊆ Ca is called an approximable concept, if for every finite subset X ⊆ A, we have
α(ω(X)) ⊆ A.
Note that (1) above allows “single-object concepts”; these will become important in §10 as repre-
sentations of object tokens (Fields, 2012), and for a hierarchial iteration of the idea in §11.
Definition 3.2. A complete algebraic lattice (henceforth, an algebraic lattice) is a partial order
which is both a complete lattice and a directed complete partial order (dcpo).
We have now the following basic representation theorem for approximable concepts (Zhang and
Shen, 2006, Th. 6.3):
Theorem 3.1. For any Chu space C = (Co,C, Ca), the set of its approximable concepts AC under
inclusion forms an algebraic lattice. Conversely, for every algebraic lattice D, there is a Chu space
C = (Co,C, Ca) such that D is order-isomorphic to AC.
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3.2 Chu spaces as information systems
An information system with “states” consisting of finite subsets of tokens selected from some set A
can be defined in terms of an underlying Chu space as follows. Let Fin(A) be the set of finite subsets
of A and choose a subset Con ⊂ Fin(A) and a relation ` (see Scott (1982) for details). Interpret the
information states x (i.e. elements of Con) as objects, the tokens a ∈ A as attributes, and let x  a
if and only if a is a member of x. In this case, the subset Con on A is called the consistency predicate,
and ` the entailment relation. Following Zhang and Shen (2006), a Chu space C = (Co,C, Ca) gives
rise to an information system (AC,ConC,`C) via the assignment AC = Ca, X `C a, if a ∈ αC◦ωC(X),
and a consistency predicate ConC for which every subset of Ca is consistent. Zhang and Shen (2006,
Th. 4.6) have shown, for a given Chu space C = (Co,C, Ca) with Ca finite, a state X ⊂ Ca, taken
to be a concept, is equivalent to X being a state of the derived information system (AC,ConC,`C).
Intuitively, a Chu morphism in Definition 2.2 correlating the objects and attributes of C to those
of some other Chu space D is a correlation between the respective information systems. Such a
morphism similarly maps sequences of flow formulas valid in C to sequences of flow formulas valid
in D, and hence correlates information processes in the respective information systems.
3.3 Ordered dynamical systems and computation
The stage is now set to develop a general notion of computation for arbitrary dynamical systems
with discrete states. As a sequence of measurements of any arbitrary dynamical system can itself
be considered a dynamical system with discrete states (Fields, 1989), nothing is lost by assuming
discreteness. Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are such systems (Nauck, Klawonn and Kruse,
2003), as are Turing machines, cellular automata, etc.
Consider a quadruple 〈S, ns,≤, T 〉, where S is the state space of an information system as
characterized above, ns is the next-state function, ≤ is a partial order and T : L −→ S is a
mapping where L denotes a propositional (‘factual’) language (Leitgeb, 2005). The map T assigns
some proposition φ of L to each state s ∈ S; hence it represents the (stipulated) semantics of
S. The action of ns, in this case, produces a sequence of propositions φ0, φ1, φ2, ... and so can be
interpreted as (in general, nonmonotonic) inference. If this sequence converges to some stable state
ψ, the action of ns has “halted” and the proposition ψ can be interpreted as the “result” of the
action of ns on φ0. The design perspective in which ns is stipulated and the reverse engineering
or debugging perspective in which ns must be discovered are both clearly supported within this
picture.
Recasting the above in the language of K-valued Chu spaces (2.1) provides a representation
of computations with imprecise inputs, outputs or both. Recalling the attribute symbol , let us
define {
s t φ iff T (φ) = s (precise state information),
s  φ iff T (φ) ≤ s (imprecise state information).
The computational interpretation is straightforward: s t φ if and only if φ completely specifies the
system state, whereas s  φ if and only if the system state is described by φ as well as some other
propositions in L. A computation with an initial state s t φ and a final state s′  ψ, for example,
would provide an ambiguous answer (ψ together with other propositions) to a precise question (φ).
This Chu/information space representation of computation has been adapted to capture Bayesian
inference in a connectionist context (Dayan et al., 1995; McClelland, 1998); we develop this repre-
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sentation further in §10. The close relationship between Chu flows and infomorphisms as defined
within Channel Theory (Barwise and Seligman, 1997) and their application to problems such as
ontology alignment are considered in §6 and §7, respectively. In particular, state space systems will
be further described in the context of Channel Theory in §7.5 and §7.7
4 Topology of information and observation
Propositions used to describe the world are semantically related; in the limit, all propositions in
any language form a connected semantic network (Sowa, 2006). Observations or, more precisely,
finitely-specifiable observational outcomes are similarly related. Considering an information system
to be defined merely over a set of propositions provides no means of capturing such relations. It
is, therefore, useful to introduce additional structure, with the addition of topological structure
a natural first step. Doing this allows a structured notion of sampling the information encoded
in a Chu space, and particularly the idea of a finite sample of attributes (FSA) for an object or
collection of objects.
4.1 The Sorkin perspective
One approach to developing an information topology is via a notion of causality ; this has been
pursued by Sorkin (1991a,b) through the development of causal sets. While the motivation in
this case has been to model the fundamental structure of spacetime in a way that could produce
the continuum of macroscopic geometry as an emergent ‘classical limit’ (see Raptis and Zapatrin
(2001); Sorkin (1991a,b) for details of the mathematical physics application domain), the techniques
employed are generally applicable to approximating a class of highly structured or idealized spaces
by means of taking a certain limit of less complex, more user-friendly spaces. The point is to
represent non-spatial information in a spatial form as means of ‘visualization’, and to consider
variation in data and observations in the context of such representations. The use of spatial
dimensions as a way of “displaying” information in a meaningful way on both the input and output
sides of connectionist systems (and more generally, ANNs) is an example of this approach. In this
case, the very complex, essentially causal relations between information computed by a learning
algorithm are approximated, on an imposed spatial array of output “units” that have no intrinsic
spatial relationships, in a way that makes them meaningful to external observers (Rogers and
McClelland, 2004, Ch. 8). An input array similarly approximates causal relations in “the world”
when the array geometry is assigned semantic significance, e.g. in computer vision applications.
Fundamental causality relations between objects x, y, z can be expressed in terms of an order
relation ‘≺’:
(1) x ≺ y ≺ z ⇒ x ≺ z (Transitivity: if y is the outcome of z, and x is the outcome of y, then
x is the outcome of z).
(2) x ≺ y and y ≺ x ⇒ x = y (Symmetry).
(3) Let [[x, y]] denote the cardinality of the number of elements z between x and y such that
x ≺ z ≺ y, then [[x, y]] <∞ (Discreteness).
These relations can also be expressed in terms of a (locally finite) partially ordered set as we do
below; we then apply the inherent sense of causality to the structure provided by Chu spaces.
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This is achieved by approximating a highly structured space by a spatial model based on simplicial
complexes and related posets as developed in Gratus and Porter (2006, 2005a,b), which we survey
in part here, and in §5.
4.2 The Sorkin poset PF
Suppose we are given a topological space X, viewed as a space of ‘observables’, and let us observe
X from a finite family of open sets (FFOS) F , not necessarily covering X. This will represent a
set of observations made on X, where objects are observed in relationship to their attributes. In
this way, the FFOS partitions X into the ‘attributes’, and X can then be regarded as a union of
‘zones’ (see below) in which two points lie in the same zone if they share the very same attributes;
in other words, they consist of clusters of points in the same open set of the FFOS, and thus cannot
be distinguished by the corresponding set of observations.
We can define an equivalence relation “∼F”, by x ∼F x′, if and only if for all U ∈ F , x ∈ U if
and only if x′ ∈ U . Thus two points are equivalent if all the observations from F attribute the same
positive or negative result on both of them. This is simply another way of stating the causality
relations above. We can factor out by this equivalence relation to obtain a quotient mapping:
piF : X −→ XF = X/ ∼ (4.1)
where the quotient XF can be regarded as encoding the observational data on X in a way that
organizes that data by “merging” equivalent observations.
The spaceXF has topological type T0∗ and corresponds to a partially ordered set (poset) denoted
PF and constructed as follows. We take [x]F to be the equivalence class of x ∈ X, with [x]F ≤ [y]F
if and only if for every open set U ∈ F , if y ∈ U , then x ∈ U . For practical purposes we consider
the family F as finite, and XF is a finite T0-space. Each point [x]F is contained in a minimal
open set U[x] of XF , and [x]F ≤ [y]F if and only if x ∈ U[y]. The resulting poset PF contains
much of the essential observational (or causal data) on X. Besides organizing that data, this poset
will serve as a means of ‘measurement’ (though not point-dependent) for gauging whether ‘objects’
and ‘attributes’ (or, ‘tokens’ and ‘types’) are seen as proximate to each other, or in contrast, are
actually very far apart. Its structure is motivated by the ideas of Sorkin (1991a), as adopted by
Gratus and Porter (2006), describing how certain types of spaces can be approximated by ‘inverse
limits’ of more regular spaces.
Observe that the FFOS F determines a secondary topology τ(F) on X which is just the topology
generated by F . If τ(X) denotes the original topology on X, then τ(F) ⊆ τ(X) with the closure
with respect to τ(F) interpreted as a proximity between ‘zones’ (see below). Let τ(PF ) denote the
quotient topology on PF such that the map
piF : (X, τ(F)) −→ (PF , τ(PF )), (4.2)
is continuous (and then is seen to be an open map). We summarize the nomenclature in the
following:
∗A topological space X is said to be a T0-space if given distinct points of X, there is an open set of X that contains
one but not the other. T0-spaces naturally give rise to a partial order defined on the set of points of X, where x ≤ y,
if for each open set U ⊆ X, y ∈ U implies x ∈ U , and conversely.
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Definition 4.1. Given X and a FFOS F , we say that the pair (PF , piF ) is a Sorkin model of
X relative to F , in which case PF is called the Sorkin poset for (X,F). Given x ∈ PF , the
corresponding subset pi−1F (x) ⊆ X is called the zone determined by x, which in general will be
neither an open nor closed subset of X.
Definition 4.2. Given two FFOSs F and G of a topological space X, we say that F is a Sorkin
refinement of G if G ⊆ τ(F).
From Gratus and Porter (2006, Prop. 11) we observe that F is a refinement of G, if and only if there
exists a continuous surjective map piFG : PF −→ PG such that the following diagram commutes
(X, τ(X))
piG ))
piF // (PF , τ(PF ))
piFG

(PG , τ(PG))
(4.3)
that is, piG = piFG ◦ piF .
4.3 A Chu FSA
We start with a basic observation that any space X along with a FFOS F can be formulated in
terms of a Chu space C = (X,∈,F) (namely, X is the set of objects, ∈=, and F is the set of
attributes). Thus an object x ∈ X satisfies an attribute U ∈ F , if x ∈ U . This type of Chu space is
said to be normal (Pratt, 1999a). Thinking back to §2.3, we see that the quotient map piF in (4.2)
is simply the universal map to the biextensional collapse of C = (X,∈,F), and that the Chu space
CPF = (F ,∈, τ(PF )) is itself biextensional, observing that the poset structure on PF is given by
αˆ(x) ≤ αˆ(y)⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ Ca (y C a⇒ x C a)⇐⇒ αˆ(x) ⊇ αˆ(y). (4.4)
To avoid possible complications, we assume, as in (Gratus and Porter, 2006), that F is suitably
‘sampled’ and extensional (briefly, F has no repetitive columns). Accordingly, we obtain a Chu
space C = (Co,C, Ca) consisting of a finite sample of attributes F resulting in a pair (C,F),
entitled a Chu FSA. Given (C,F), we call C|F = (Co,C,F) the corestriction of (C,F).
4.4 Putting a topology on a Chu space
The next step is to put a topology on a Chu space C. Thus, we commence by saying that C is
topologically closed if the attributes Ca is a topology on objects Co, meaning that C is normal, and
Ca includes all unions and finite intersections. Without too much loss of generality, we assume that
C is biextensional. Thus given C, we have a topologically closed Chu space
τ(C) = (Co,∈, τ(Ca)), (4.5)
which is naturally a topological closure of C. Furthermore, there is a universal Chu morphism
τ : τ(C) −→ C, with τo : Co −→ Co the identity, and τa : Ca −→ τ(Ca) the inclusion. The point
here is that τ(C) contains the same informational (or observational) structure as the original C, and
in τ(C) the information has been encoded by means of the propositional operations of geometric
logic, and sampled via F ⊂ Ca. Hence as proposed by Gratus and Porter (2006, 2005b), a Sorkin
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model CF for (C,F) is defined to be the biextensional collapse\Sorkin poset of C|F . Gratus and
Porter (2006, Prop. 18) have also shown that any row x in CF consists of n entries 0 or 1, and
hence corresponds to a flow formula (§2.2):
(x  ai1) ∧ · · · ∧ (x  aik) ∧ ¬(x  aik+1) ∧ · · · ∧ ¬(x  ain), (4.6)
in turn showing that the rows of CF can be considered to encode the elementary flow formulae:
∃x(
∧
i∈F1
(x  ai) ∧
∧
i∈F2
¬(x  ai)), (4.7)
for given partitions (F1,F2) of F .
Given Chu spaces C = (Co,C, Ca) and D = (Do,D, Da), we say that C is a Sorkin refinement
of D if there exists a Chu transform φ : τ(C) −→ D, which is the identity on objects (φo(x) = x).
Further, any Chu space is a Sorkin refinement of itself, the Sorkin refinement is transitive, and if C
is both extensional and a Sorkin refinement of D, then the map φ is uniquely determined (Gratus
and Porter, 2006, Prop. 20).
5 Introducing simplicial methods on Chu spaces
Given a topology on an information space, algebraic methods can be used to extend the topology
into a geometry. The resulting (discrete) geometry provides a natural representation of sets of
observations made at different resolutions or scales, and hence a natural way to represent coarser-
to finer-grained approximations of the topology. Such approximations will provide, in §11.3, the
basis for a mereotopology of “parts” of objects.
5.1 Simplicial complexes: basic definitions
We first introduce simplicial complexes as representations of observational data, following Cordier
and Porter (1989); Friedman (2012); Goerss and Jardine (1999) and Spanier (1966).
Definition 5.1. A simplicial complex K consists of a set K0 of objects called the vertices and a
set of finite, non-empty subsets of K0 called the simplices. The latter satisfy the condition that if
σ ⊂ K0 is a simplex, and if τ ⊂ σ (with τ 6= ∅), then τ is also a simplex. Simplicial complexes are
objects in a category denoted Simpl.
Simplicial complexes over an information space provide the structure needed to define an informa-
tion geometry. To each simplicial complex K is associated the polyhedron or geometric realization
of K, denoted |K|, formed from the set of all functions K0 −→ [0, 1] satisfying:
i) if α ∈ |K|, then the set {v ∈ K0 : α(v) 6= 0} is a simplex of K;
ii)
∑
v∈K0 α(v) = 1.
Here each function α can be thought of as “picking out” a subset of vertices to be the vertices of
some particular polyhedron. These functions are normalized so that they “pick out” each vertex
to the same extent.
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For any simplex s ∈ K, there is an associated set |s| = {α ∈ |K| : α(v) 6= 0 ⇒ v ∈ s} as well
as a set 〈s〉 = {α ∈ |K| : α(v) 6= 0⇔ v ∈ s}. Often α(v) is called the vth barycentric coordinate of
α, and the mapping |K| −→ [0, 1] defined by pv(α) = α(v) is the vth barycentric projection of α.
With these coordinates, a metric d can be defined on K as given by
d(α, β) =
( ∑
v∈K0
(pv(α)− pv(β))2
) 1
2 . (5.1)
This distance d(α, β) measures the number of vertices shared between the polyhedra “picked out”
by α and β, normalized to account for differences in the numbers of vertices of the two polyhedra.
Definition 5.2. If K and L are two simplicial complexes, a simplicial mapping f : K −→ L is a
map f0 : K0 −→ L0 of vertex sets that preserves simplices, meaning that if σ ⊂ K0 is a simplex of
K, then its image f(σ) ⊂ L0 is a simplex of L.
Any simplicial complex K gives rise, in a straightforward way, to a poset, namely the poset of
its “faces.” The elements of this poset are the simplices of K, arranged according to the rule σ ≤ ρ
if σ is a face of ρ, that is, if σ ⊆ ρ as subsets of the vertex set K0. Note that unions of “adjoining”
faces are faces with this definition. We will tacitly employ the (contravariant) functor relating the
categories Simpl −→ Sets to speak of a simplicial set corresponding to its underlying structure as
a simplicial complex.
5.2 Simplicial homotopy
Two simplicial maps f, g : X −→ Y of simplicial sets X,Y are said to be homotopic if there exists
a simplicial map H : X × I −→ Y (here I = [0, 1] the closed unit interval) such that H|X×{0} = g,
and H|X×{1} = f . In other words, we have g = H ◦ i0, and f = H ◦ i1, with respect to inclusion
maps i0 : X × {0} ↪→ X × I, and i1 : X × {1} ↪→ X × I. This is summarized by the following
commutative diagram
X × {1}
i1

f
((
X × I H // Y
X × {0}
i0
OO
g
66
(5.2)
so that we have H(x, 0) = f(x) and H(x, 1) = g(x).†
5.3 The nerve of a relation
For a space X and open cover F of X, the Cˇech nerve N(F) of F is defined as the simplicial
complex whose vertices are the (open) sets in F and for which {U0, . . . , Un} is an n-simplex of
N(F) if and only if ⋂ni=0 Ui 6= ∅. Intuitively, the Cˇech nerve is the simplicial complex over F
†We adopt this natural definition of a simplicial homotopy as found in Friedman (2012); Goerss and Jardine
(1999). In Friedman (2012) it is compared with the traditional, more technically oriented definition as seen in other
textbooks on the subject.
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comprising only connected simplices. As pointed out by Gratus and Porter (2006), the face poset
PF as defined above bears a close relation with N(F), but they need not be identified. In a dual
sense, there is the Vietoris complex V (F) of (X,F) in which the vertices are simply the points
of X, and 〈x0, . . . , xn〉 is an n-simplex if there exists a U ∈ F that contains them all, that is,
{x0, . . . , xn} ⊆ U .
Dowker (1952) provides an abstraction in this setting, given a relation R ⊆ X × Y from X to
Y . A simplicial complex KR, called the nerve of the relation can be specified by: i) the vertices
of KR are those elements x ∈ X for which there exists a y such that (x, y) ∈ R, and ii) the set
{x0, . . . , xn} ∈ X is an n-simplex if and only if there exists some y such that (xi, y) ∈ R, for
0 ≤ i ≤ n. From this it can be deduced that N(F) and V (F) each provide the same information
about the open cover F up to homotopy.
Example 5.1. Let us exemplify some of these concepts for the basic case of the circle S1, following
Porter (2002). Here we take an open covering F = {U1, U2, U3}, relative to polar coordinates, with
U1 =
(− 2pi
3
,
2pi
3
)
;
U2 = “
(
0,−2pi
3
)
” i.e.
(
0, pi
] ∪ (− pi,−2pi
3
)
;
U3 = “
(2pi
3
, 0
)
” i.e.
(2pi
3
, pi
] ∪ (− pi, 0).
(5.3)
Every point of S1, with the exception of 0, 2pi3 and −2pi3 , is in exactly two of these, with a total of six
equivalence classes. Choosing three representatives for the non-singleton classes gives the following
minimal open sets:
U0 = U1, U 2pi
3
= U2, U− 2pi
3
= U3
Upi
3
= U1 ∩ U2 := U12, U−pi
3
= U1 ∩ U3 := U13, Upi = U2 ∩ U3 := U23.
Now we have a partially ordered set with associated Hasse diagram
1 2 3
12 23 13
(5.4)
showing that S1F has 6 points, and the homotopy type of the former is that of S
1.
If we set X = S1 and take the open cover F = {U1, U2, U3} as above, the vertices of N(F) =
〈U1〉, 〈U2〉, 〈U3〉, and the 1-simplices of N(F) = 〈U1, U2〉, 〈U1, U3〉, 〈U2, U3〉. Thus, N(F) may be
represented schematically by the diagram
2
1
1,2
1,3
3
2,3
(5.5)
Recalling that any simplicial complex determines a poset by subset inclusion of simplices, it can be
seen that the resulting poset is the opposite of that representing XF .
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5.4 The Cˇech and Vietoris nerves of a Chu space
In the context of a Chu space C = (Co,C, Ca), the Cˇech nerve is the simplicial complex denoted
N(C) with vertex set Ca and where a (non-empty) subset {a0, . . . ap} of Ca is a p-simplex if there is
an object x ∈ Co satisfying x C ai, for 0 ≤ i ≤ p. This is motivated by the fundamental principle
that for simplicial complexes, the nerve can be viewed as a set of instructions serving to construct
(an approximation of) a space by fitting together the individual geometric simplicies.‡ At the same
time, the associated Vietoris nerve V (C) is, in this context, the Cˇech nerve of the dual space C⊥.
Given that some {a0, . . . ap} comprises a simplex, the latter can be symbolized as 〈a0, . . . ap〉.
As pointed out by Gratus and Porter (2006, §3) there may be possible complications in dealing
with induced Chu morphisms, since the set Ca may be infinitely large. To remedy this situation, it
is necessary to finitely sample the attributes by restricting consideration to a subset F of Ca. Thus
following Gratus and Porter (2006, Prop. 4), if f = (fo, fa) : P = (Po,P , Pa) −→ Q = (Qo,Q
, Qa) is a morphism of Chu spaces, and F is an open cover (the observations) representing a finite
sample of the attributes of Q, i.e we have F ⊆ Qa and finite, then there is an induced map
f = (fo, fa) : P = (Po,P , fa(F)) −→ Q = (Qo,Q,F). (5.6)
Furthermore, there are also induced simplicial maps given as follows: firstly, with respect to the
Vietoris nerve, we have
V (f) : V (Po,P , fa(F)) −→ V (Qo,Q,F), (5.7)
given by V (f)〈p0, . . . , pn〉 = 〈fo(p0), . . . , fo(pn)〉, and secondly, for any choice of splitting, the
function fa : F −→ fa(F) (recall F ⊆ Qa) induces a simplicial map with respect to the Cˇech nerve
N(f) : N(Po,P , fa(F)) −→ N(Qo,Q, fa(F)), (5.8)
given by N(f)〈fa(q0), . . . , fa(qn)〉 = 〈q0, . . . , qn〉.
5.5 The Chu FSA and induced morphisms between nerves
The above simplicial procedures show that, for any Chu FSA (C,F), there are two associated
simplicial complexes N(C|F ) and V (C|F ), along with the associated posets of their faces. Recall that
we took CF to denote the biextensional collapse\Sorkin poset of C|F . Let F̂ denote a corresponding
family of attributes. Again assuming C|F is extensional (no repeated columns in F) then (Gratus
and Porter, 2006, Th. 21), the quotient map
piF : C|F −→ CF , (5.9)
exists, and there is an induced isomorphism
piNF : N(C,F)
∼=−→ N(C|F , F̂), (5.10)
of simplicial complexes.
Intuitively, representing a set of observations of an FSA of a Chu space by a simplicial complex
renders them a coarse-graining of the underlying Chu space, with the “grain size” determined by
the number of vertices in the Cˇech nerve. The adjacency relations implicit in the Cˇech nerve provide
this coarse-graining with a local geometry.
‡The nerve specifies, in effect, which simplices adjoin each other by “sharing an edge.” Porter (2002) provides a
number of illustrative examples providing an intuition leading to the discussion in Gratus and Porter (2006).
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6 An excursion into Channel Theory I
6.1 Classifications: Tokens and Types
Situation Theory and Channel Theory Barwise and Seligman (1997) provide a structure for describ-
ing informational relations in the setting of information flow through systems distributed across
space and time. They provide a conceptual and schematic generalization of the ontological notion
of information as causal connection introduced by Dretske (1981). An assumption lending realism
to the approach is that the channels through which information flows may have implicit or unknown
properties that influence the nature of the inferences they implement.
We focus here on Channel Theory, the fundamental concept of which is the idea of a classification
relating tokens to the types that encompass them.
Definition 6.1. A classification A = 〈Tok(A),Typ(A),A〉 consists of a set Tok(A) consisting of
the tokens of A, a set Typ(A) consisting of the types of A, and a classification relation
A⊆ Tok(A)× Typ(A), (6.1)
that classifies tokens to types.
A classification A = 〈Tok(A),Typ(A),A〉 has the structure of a Chu space, that is, via the
assignment (Tok(A),A,Typ(A)) 7→ (object,, attribute) or, as is more typical in Barwise and
Seligman (1997), the ‘dual’ form (Tok(A),A,Typ(A)) 7→ (attribute,, object). As will be seen
in §6.5 below, these interpretations are interchangeable. Let us also keep in mind that for Chu
spaces, “objects” and “attributes” can be aptly replaced by terms such as “events” and “states”,
with  then interpreted as selecting the events that occur in a given state or, alternatively, the
states participating in a given event.
Remark 6.1. As for a K-valued Chu space in 2.1, we may speak of a K-valued Classification
A = 〈Tok(A),Typ(A),A〉, with a classification relation A⊆ Tok(A) × Typ(A) −→ K, where
A (a, b) is an element of K.
Example 6.1. Let A = 〈Pts,U,A〉 where Pts denotes points of a topological space, U denotes
the open sets of that space, and x A U if and only if x ∈ U . Thus, points are classified by the
open sets in which they are contained. The open sets may be classified by the points within them
by reversing A.
Example 6.2. Following Allwein, Moskowitz and Chang (2004), let
FOL = 〈Models, Sentences,FOL〉,
where Sentences are sentences in First Order Logic (FOL). Models are models of FOL sentences,
and x FOL S if and only if x is a model of the sentence S. Here, there are various internal
relations holding on both the set of sentences and that of models, but none are imposed as external
conditions in this case without further modification. One could also reverse matters, by taking the
Types to be Models, and the Tokens as Sentences, so that Sentences in this case would be classified
by Models.
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6.2 Infomorphisms
Here we recall the idea of a Chu morphism in order to link the information between two given
classifications A = 〈Tok(A),Typ(A),A〉 and B = 〈Tok(B),Typ(B),B〉. In this case it is useful
to define “switching relations”
−→
f : Typ(A) −→ Typ(B) and ←−f : Tok(B) −→ Tok(A) that can be
specified by introducing the Channel Theory concept of an infomorphism. Specifically:
Definition 6.2. Given two classificationsA = 〈Tok(A),Typ(A),A〉 and B = 〈Tok(B),Typ(B),B
〉, an infomorphism f : A B, is a pair of contravariant maps
i)
−→
f : Typ(A) −→ Typ(B)
ii)
←−
f : Tok(B) −→ Tok(A)
such that for all b ∈ Tok(B), and for all a ∈ Typ(A), we have
←−
f (b) A a, if and only if b B
−→
f (a). (6.2)
This last condition may be schematically represented by:
Typ(A)
−→
f // Typ(B)
B
Tok(A)
A
Tok(B)
←−
foo
(6.3)
Note that this definition, given in Barwise and Seligman (1997), employs the ‘dual’ interpre-
tation of types as objects and tokens as attributes. Interpreting tokens as objects and types as
attributes yields infomorphisms with the usual Chu-morphism arrow directions.
Remark 6.2. In the context of situations, ‘attributes’ can be interpreted as statements of ‘situation
types’. In the Dretske spirit, to say that “x is T1” transmits information that “y is T2” can be
represented as an informorphism representing these classification statements. Here the content of
information such as (T1, T2) is defined as the ‘type’, and the carrier of the respective types, such as
(x, y), is defined as the ‘token’.
Example 6.3. Let M = 〈Messages, Contents,M〉 where Messages are classified by their Con-
tents (Allwein, Moskowitz and Chang, 2004). Suppose we have another such classification M′ =
〈Messages′, Contents′,M′〉. An infomorphism f : M −→M′ may represent a function decoding
messages from M′ to messages in M, so that whatever can be noted about the translation, may be
mapped into something noted in the original message. That is, mf M C ⇔ m M′ Cf .
Example 6.4. Here is an example from decision theory (Allwein, Yang and Harrison, 2011, §2.3).
Let s be a classification of propositional logic and its model states, and let f represent a decision
which evaluates a state s and the agent making the decision (e.g. “either walk home, or take the
bus home”). Let O be the classification of outcomes, and let sf represent a particular outcome of
the decision of choosing either option (either “walk home” or “take a bus home”). A proposition,
denoted Q over outcomes (in accordance with a slogan such as “Keeping Fit”) characterizes them,
and let Qf be the proposition categorizing all of the states in which Q is satisfied. Thus, with
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respect to the above scheme of infomorphisms, we set the classification A = O, and B = S, and
(6.3) thus leads to
Typ(O)
−→
f // Typ(S)
S
Tok(O)
O
Tok(S)
←−
foo
(6.4)
in which case the infomorphism condition is expressed by s S Qf if and only if sf O Q.
Remark 6.3. It is worth noting that in the framework of infomorphisms, there is a natural mapping
between tokens A and the set of informational states:
A −→ S(A). (6.5)
For instance, as pointed out by Barwise and Seligman (1997, §2.5), the truth classification of a first
order language L is the classification whose types are the sentences of L, and the tokens are the
L-structures. In which case, the classification relation is defined by N  ϕ, if and only if ϕ is true
in the structure of L (Barwise and Seligman, 1997, Example 4.3).
6.3 Information channels
An information channel Chan consists of an indexed family {fi : Ai  C}i∈I of infomorphisms
having a common codomain C called the core of the channel Chan:
C
A1
f1
==
A2
f2
OO
. . . Ai . . .
fi
ee (6.6)
The core C is essentially a carrier of information flow between the fi and hence between the
classifications Ai, and is itself a classification in the above sense. The tokens Tok(C) of C are
called connections. A connection c is said to connect the tokens fi(c) of the classifications Ai for
i ∈ I (note that tokens are mapped from C to the Ai in the ‘dual’ interpretation of Barwise and
Seligman (1997)). A channel with index set {0, . . . , n− 1} is called an n-ary channel. Composing
information channels amounts to taking their limit and the channels themselves may be refinable
by straightforward categorical means (Barwise and Seligman, 1997).
The above definition extends the intuitive picture of a channel as a wire connecting two agents
(i.e. classifiers) to the idea of a blackboard or other shared memory via which multiple classifiers
exchange information. The shared memory C being itself a classifier provides it with a structure
that can affect how information is written to and read from it. Consistent with the essentially
causal notion of information of Dretske (1981), the connections between the tokens of different
classifiers are purely functional; no overarching semantics is assumed. How such a semantics can
be constructed, post hoc, given a channel is discussed in §7.3 below.
Example 6.5. For instance, if we have a binary channel Chan = {f : A  C, g : B  C}, then
the local logic (see §6.8 below) on B induced by Chan, is the logic LgChan(B) = g−1[f [Lg(A)]] (in
Barwise and Seligman (1997, 14.1) classifications A and B are interpreted as “idealization” and
“reality”, respectively). This induced logic can be characterized by (Barwise and Seligman, 1997,
Prop. 14.2):
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(i) A partition 〈Γ,∆〉 of Typ(B) is consistent in LgChan(B) if and only if 〈f−1[g[Γ]], f−1[g[∆]]〉
is the state description of some a ∈ Tok(A).
(ii) A token b ∈ Tok(B) is normal in LgChan(B), if and only if it is connected to some token
a ∈ Tok(A).
6.4 Cocone of infomorphisms
A network of infomorphisms between classifications admits a limit classification that gathers all of
the information in the network into a single classification (a cone) with projections back down to
the individual classifications Barwise and Seligman (1997). There is a dual notion which we will
describe as follows. A channel is an instance of the more general category-theoretic concept of a
cocone being the core classification. To motivate the construction, consider any finite directed graph
with vertex labels 1, 2, ..., n and edge labels fij . Considering such a graph to represent a network of
communicating agents is, from a category-theoretic perspective, invoking a map G (technically, a
functor from the category of finite directed graphs to the category of classifications) that constructs
a classification G(i) at each vertex and an infomorphism G(fij) at each edge. A commuting finite
cocone of infomorphisms (e.g. Barwise and Seligman (1997); Allwein, Yang and Harrison (2011))
is a finite network of classifications G(i) and infomorphisms G(fij), a vertex classification C, and
a collection of infomorphisms gi : G(i) −→ C.
C
G(1) . . .
g1
55
G(i)
gi
==
G(fij)
// G(j)
gj
aa
. . . G(n)
gn
ii (6.7)
The commutativity condition is that for all fij , we have gi = gj ◦ G(fij). The base of the cocone
consists of the classifications and infomorphisms constructed by G; the cocone vertex classification
C together with the maps gi, is a channel. Note that in the complementary sense, a commuting
finite cone of infomorphisms consists of a finite network of classifications G(i) and infomorphisms
G(fji), a vertex classification C, and a collection of infomorphisms gi : G(i) −→ C. For all fji, we
have gi = G(fji) ◦ gj , and all arrows in the above diagram are reversed.
In short, we have this colimit classification into which there are infomorphisms from each con-
stituent classification, and this colimit contains all of the information that is common to the different
component parts of the network. The generalization from channel to cocone will prove useful in
the discussion of “minimal covers” of distributed systems in §7.2. We further characterize cocones
and relate them to colimits in the descriptive discussion of §8. We then apply these concepts to
model abstraction-based categorization in §10 and to mereological categorization in §11.
6.5 The flip of a classification
For any classification A, the flip of A, is the classification A⊥ whose tokens are the types of A,
whose types are the tokens of A, such that α A⊥ a if and only if a A α (see Barwise and Seligman
(1997, §4.4)). In deciding how to model a classification there may be epistemological questions, e.g.
the types in question are given as things or attributes we may know about, and the tokens are those
things we wish to have information about. The fact that the flip of a classification is a classification
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(and both can be treated as Chu spaces) and these behave well under infomorphisms, means that
a situation involving types or tokens, can be dualized to tokens or types. For instance, “the type
set of a token” dualizes to “the token set of a type”. Effectively, f : A B is an informorphism if
and only if f⊥ : B⊥  A⊥ is an infomorphism (Barwise and Seligman, 1997, Prop. 4.19). Further,
(A⊥)⊥ = A with (f⊥)⊥ = f , and (fg)⊥ = g⊥f⊥ (Barwise and Seligman, 1997, Prop. 4.20). Thus
for f, f⊥ respectively, we have the diagrams
Typ(A)
−→
f // Typ(B)
B
Tok(A)
A
Tok(B)
←−
foo
Tok(B)
←−
f // Tok(A)
−1A
Typ(B)
−1B
Typ(A)
−→
foo
(6.8)
6.6 The nerve of a classification
As any classification is a Chu space, any operation defined for Chu spaces is meaningful for a
classification. A finite sample F of ‘attributes’, for example, becomes a finite sample of ‘tokens’
(or ‘types’). Simplicial complexes are defined as in §5.1 and nerves as in §5.4. The Cˇech nerve
of a classification A = 〈Tok(A),Typ(A),A〉, for example, is the simplicial complex N(A) with
vertex set Tok(A), where a (non-empty) subset {b0, . . . bp} of Tok(A) is a p-simplex if there is a
type v ∈ Typ(A) satisfying v A bi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ p. The notion of the Vietoris nerve follows in a
similar way as in §5.4.
If F = Tok(B) is a finite sample of tokens of a classification B, we have the infomorphism (6.3):
f = (
←−
f ,
−→
f ) : (
←−
f (F),Typ(A),A) −→ (F ,Typ(B),B), (6.9)
while for a finite sample G ⊆ Typ(A), we have:
f = (
←−
f ,
−→
f ) : (Tok(A),G,A) −→ (Tok(B),−→f (G),B), (6.10)
We will henceforth assume that finite samples of tokens (and types) have been taken, so that we
may consider, as in (5.8), well-defined simplicial maps
N(f) : N(A) −→ N(B), (6.11)
as defined for the Cˇech nerve of the corresponding Chu spaces, here with respect to finite samples
of tokens and types.
6.7 Associating a theory with a classification
Here and in the following sections we collect together some useful definitions from Barwise and
Seligman (1997) and Barwise (1997), starting with sequents and theories:
Definition 6.3. Let Σ be an arbitrary set (which may be viewed as set of types). A binary
relation ` between subsets of Σ is called a consequence relation on Σ. A (Gentzen) sequent is a
pair I = 〈Γ,∆〉 of subsets of Σ (here it is apt to view Γ and ∆ as sets of situation types). A sequent
I = 〈Γ,∆〉 is said to hold of a situation s provided that if s supports every type in Γ, then it
supports some type in ∆. A sequent I is said to be information about a set S of situations if it
holds at each s ∈ S; here again the causal notion of information flow is evident. Finally, a sequent
is called a partition of a set Σ′ if Γ ∪∆ = Σ′ and Γ ∩∆ = ∅.
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Definition 6.4. A theory is a pair T = 〈Σ,`T 〉, where `T is a consequence relation on Σ. A
constraint of the theory T is a sequent 〈Γ,∆〉 of Σ for which Γ `T ∆. A sequent 〈Γ,∆〉 is T -
consistent if Γ 0T ∆.
Here again, the idea of some aspects of a situation either causally requiring or merely causally
allowing other aspects of a situation makes this definition clear.
Each classification has a theory associated with it in the following way (see also Definition 6.6
below). A theory Th(A) = (ΣA,`A) generated by a classification A, satisfies for all types α and
all sets Γ,Γ′,∆,∆′,Σ′,Σ0,Σ1 of types (Barwise and Seligman, 1997, Prop 9.5):
(1) Identity : α ` α.
(2) Weakening : If Γ ` ∆, then Γ,Γ′ ` ∆,∆′.
(3) Global cut : If Γ,Σ0 ` ∆,Σ1, for each partition 〈Σ0,Σ1〉 of Σ, then Γ ` ∆.
More generally, we can say that a theory T = 〈Σ,`T 〉 is regular if it satisfies the above three
conditions.
6.8 Local logics
We can specify a classification of a regular theory T as given by:
(1) Typ(Cl(T )) = Typ(T ).
(2) Tok(Cl(T )) = {〈Γ,∆〉 : 〈Γ,∆〉 is a T consistent partition of Typ(T )}.
(3) 〈Γ,∆〉 `Cl(T ) α if and only if α ∈ Γ.
Indeed, for any regular theory it can be seen that Th(Cl(T )) = T .
Since we are mainly considering distributed systems, and information processing entails com-
putation within a logical framework, the following system of local logics (Barwise and Seligman,
1997, Def. 12.1) is one suited to representing various types of state spaces.
Definition 6.5. A local logic consists of a triple (L = 〈Tok(L),Typ(L),L〉,`L,NL) in which we
have:
(1) a classification L = 〈Tok(L),Typ(L),L〉,
(2) a regular theory Th(L) = (Typ(L),`L), and
(3) a subset NL ⊂ Tok(L), called the normal tokens of L, which satisfy all of the constraints of
the theory Th(L) in (2).
Definition 6.6. Let A be a classification. The local logic generated by A, denoted Lg(A), has
classification A, a regular theory Th(A) = (Typ(A),`A), and all its tokens are normal. A logic is
said to be natural if it is generated by some classification.
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In fact, for any local logic L on A, we have L = Lg(A) by Barwise and Seligman (1997, Prop.
12.7). This relationship will be exemplified in Example 7.1 in the context of ontologies.
Intuitively, a local logic is “local” to the classification that generates it. Infomorphisms allow
mapping the local logic of one classification to that of another; hence we can think of channels
as supporting the flow of locally-defined logical relations between classifications. Recalling from
§5.5 that any classification can be interpreted as defining a coarse-graining and hence a “scale”
at which information is being organized and represented, each local logic can be thought of as a
“logic at some level of description.” This interpretation is made explicit in §10.5 and §11.3 below.
As any classification can also be interpreted as describing a state space (§3.2), one can further
associate a canonical logic Lg(S) to any state space S. Specifically, if S is such a state space with a
classification of events Evt(S), then we can speak of an S-logic as a logic L on this classification such
that Lg(S) ⊆ L, with the intuition that this S-logic can accommodate the theory that is implicit to
the structure of S (Barwise and Seligman, 1997, §16).
Remark 6.4. In Barwise (1997), L is called an information context and ` is a binary relation
relating sets of situation types. In this case NL is said to be a set of normal situations. Intuitively,
these are the situations that the available information concerns. They may comprise all or only some
of the situations satisfying the information. For instance, we may start with some set of normal
situations accounting for an individual’s experiences to date, and then the information context
consists of all the sequents satisfied by, i.e. consistent with, this experience. Stepping outside of
the context generates “surprise” in the sense of expectation violation (cf. Friston (2010)).
Next, we look to what extent an infomorphism between classifications will respect the associated
local logics. This is given by the following (Barwise and Seligman (1997, 12.3)):
Definition 6.7. A logic infomorphism f : L1  L2, consists of a covariant pair f = 〈f ,̂ f∨〉 of
functions satisfying
(1) f : Cl(L1)  Cl(L2) is an infomorphism of classifications.
(2) f̂: Th(L1) −→ Th(L2) is a theory interpretation, and
(3) f∨[NL2 ] −→ NL1
For further consequences of this definition, see Barwise and Seligman (1997).
6.9 Boolean Classification
We can exemplify local logics following Barwise and Seligman (1997); Barwise (1986) in terms of
a Boolean classification A = 〈S,Σ,,∧,¬〉. Here we have a set S of situations (tokens as objects)
and a set Σ of propositions (types as attributes). This leads to a Boolean local logic L = 〈A,`, N〉
where N ⊆ S consists of the normal situations (Barwise and Seligman, 1997; Barwise, 1986). If
s ∈ N is a normal situation, Γ ` ∆ and s  p, for all p ∈ Γ, then s  q for some q ∈ ∆. A partial
ordering “⊆” on local logics L1,L2 on a fixed classification of A is defined by L1 ⊆ L2, if and only
if
(1) for all sets Γ,∆ of propositions, Γ `L1 ∆ entails Γ `L2 ∆, and
(2) every situation of A that is normal in L2 is also normal in L1.
23
Now, if we take any set of sequents T , the logic Lg(AT ) generated by T on A:
(i) has as normal situations all of those situations that satisfy the sequents in T ,
(ii) has as constraints all sequents satisfied by all situations in N , and
(iii) has as normal situations all of the situations of A satisfying these constraints.
Given a fixed Boolean classification (Barwise, 1986):
(1) If T0 ⊆ T1, then Lg(AT0) ⊆ Lg(AT1).
(2) If N0 ⊇ N1, then Lg(AN0) ⊆ Lg(AN1).
Example 6.6. Suppose A is a classification of bird sightings (observations), and N consists of the
actual sightings to date. Then Lg(AN ) has as constraints all sequents satisfied by all those bird
sightings to date, and the normal situations consist of all bird sightings that satisfy all of these
constraints, a set that clearly contains N . This logic may entail the constraint BIRD ` FLY, a
constraint that holds as long as the situations encountered are meaningfully compatible with the
elements of N . But now, suppose a penguin is observed. It will lie outside of the normal situations
since it violates BIRD ` FLY. This observation uncovers a new set N ′ ⊃ N , and accordingly their
logics satisfy Lg(AN ′) ⊆ Lg(AN ). There will be fewer constraints tenable in Lg(AN ′) as we can see,
since BIRD 0 FLY in this new logic.
7 An excursion into Channel Theory II
Classifications and channels have been applied widely in theoretical computer science; we briefly
review some of these applications here as motivations for applying these tools to perceptual pro-
cessing.
7.1 The information channel in a MLP network
One of the earliest ANNs studied was the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) network Rosenblatt (1961);
Rumelhart et al. (1986). As with typical ANNs, it has an input layers (Ii), hidden layers (Hi),
and an output layer (Oi) with weighted directional (in an MLP, exclusively feedforward) linkages
between subsequent layers. Kikuchi et al. (2003) develop a Chu space/Channel Theory representa-
tion of a 3-layer MLP, showing how the synaptic weights between layers form a channel; we follow
their example closely.
Let woij denote a synaptic weight between the j-th neuron in the hidden layer and the i-th
neuron in the output layer. Similarly, let whjk denote a synaptic weight between the k-th neuron
in the input layer and the j-th neuron in the hidden layer. Then for a given state function f(x),
the layers Oi, Hi and Ii are related in accordance with
Oi = f(
∑
j
woijHj) = f(
∑
j
woij f(
∑
k
whjkIk)). (7.1)
It is convenient to regard an MLP with a fixed topology as a map F : I −→ O, from the input
data space I = {Ii} to the output data space O = {Oi}, so that F is uniquely defined by a point
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in the parameter space of weights Φ = {〈wh,wo〉}. In this way, a fixed topology on a MLP can
be represented as F〈wh,wo〉, once given 〈wh,wo〉 ∈ Φ.
Next consider the sub-parameter spaces Φh = {〈wh〉} and Φo = {〈wo〉}, and the following
three classifications
(1) A = (Tok(A),Typ(A),A) (the states of “cognition” i.e. of O)
(2) B = (Tok(B),Typ(B),B) (the states of the “environment” i.e. of I)
(3) C = (Tok(C),Typ(C),C) (the states of the network)
where for the tokens A = Φh, B = Φo and C = Φ, we define projections
gh : Φ −→ Φh, 〈wh,wo〉 7→ 〈wh〉
go : Φ −→ Φo, 〈wh,wo〉 7→ 〈wo〉
(7.2)
as well as the obvious respective inclusions fh : Φh −→ Φ, fo : Φo −→ Φ. Thus, we obtain a core
(and vertex of a cocone) that is in C along with an information channel
C = 〈wh,wo〉
〈wh〉
fh
88
〈wo〉
fo
ff
(7.3)
where, as shown by Kikuchi et al. (2003), an algorithm for modifying 〈wh,wo〉 corresponds to a
local logic on C. This method can be developed in terms of Distributed Systems, as explained below
in §7.2 (see also Remark 7.1).
7.2 Distributed Systems
Following the development of Barwise and Seligman (1997, Ch. 6) we provide an example of
Dretske’s “Xerox principle”, namely, that information flow is transitive. Consider two information
channels sharing common infomorphisms. Suppose the first channel represents the examination of
a map, capturing the notion of a person’s perceptual state carrying information about the map
being examined. The second channel represents the informational relationship between the map
and the region it depicts. These coupled channels can be illustrated:
B1 B2
A1
f1
==
A2
f2
aa
f3
==
A3
f4
aa (7.4)
Recall that the elements of Tok(B1) are ‘connections’. In this case the connections are spatio-
temporal perceptual events involving persons in Tok(A1) looking at maps in (i.e. elements of)
Tok(A2). The connections of the second channel, elements of Tok(B2), are spatio-temporal events
involving making the maps in Tok(A2) to represent various regions in Tok(A3). Under certain
circumstances, a person’s perceptual state carries information about a particular mountain, given
that the person is reading a map showing that mountain. In this regard, we may reasonably consider
A1 as the idealized space of the physical space A3.
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The next step is to construct another channel that fits both B1 and B2 together. The process
is: i) choose a person, ii) go to a map she is reading, and then iii) proceed to the region shown
on that map. Here we will restrict to pairs c = (b1, b2) ((perceptual event, map-making)), so that
f2(b1) = f3(b2) = a2 holds, i.e. there is just one map in question. In this way, types β1 = f2(α2)
and β2 = f3(α2)) are equivalent since they are both translations of a2. This is built into the
channel by identifying β1 and β2 (cf. the biextensional collapse of a Chu space) and gives rise to
a new classification C having the above tokens and Typ(C) = Typ(B1 ∪B2), but identifying types
originating from a common type in A2. Thus we obtain a new channel with core C, connecting B1
and B2, as depicted below:
C
B1
g1
==
B2
g2
aa
A1
f1
==
A2
f2
aa
f3
==
A3
f4
aa
(7.5)
The channel infomorphisms are defined via composition h1 = g1f1, and h3 = g2h4, so linking A1
to A3.
In general, we have
Definition 7.1. A Distributed System A consists of an indexed family Cl(A) = {Ai}i∈I of classifi-
cations, together with a set Inf(A) of infomorphisms having both domain and codomain in Cl(A).
Each classification may be taken to support a local logic, along with the core of the channel.
Definition 7.2. An information channel Chan = {hi : Ai  C} covers a distributed system A
if Cl(A) = {Ai}i∈I , and for each i, j ∈ I, and for each infomorphism f : Ai  Aj in Inf(A), the
following diagram commutes
C
Ai
hi
>>
f
// Aj
hj
`` (7.6)
Chan is said to be a minimal cover if it covers A, and for every other channel D covering A there
is a unique infomorphism from C to D.
A minimal cover of a system A converts the entire distributed system, consisting of multiple
channels, into a single channel. Every distributed system has a minimal cover, and this cover is
unique up to isomorphism (Barwise and Seligman, 1997, Th. 6.5).
Remark 7.1. The constructions of §7.1 and §7.2 can be extended to parallel distributed process-
ing (PDP) and to more general multi-layer, bidirectional ANNs (see e.g. Dawson (2005); Rogers
and McClelland (2004); Rumelhart et al. (1986)). They are also applicable for modelling con-
structs of the massively parallel, competitively based, distributed system of the Global Neuronal
Workspace (GNW) as studied in Baars and Franklin (2003); Dehaene and Naccache (2001); De-
haene and Changeux (2004); Wallace (2005). Such modelling can be implemented, for example, by
the Learned Intelligent Distribution Agent (LIDA) architecture (Baars and Franklin, 2003; Franklin
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and Patterson, 2006; Friedlander and Franklin, 2008). As observed by Maia and Cleeremans (2005),
feedforward and feedback projections in connectionist networks can engage selective attention to-
ward more salient inputs, producing yet strong weighting, that can predict which of the competing
elements will gain access to the GNW central core (cf. Friston (2010); Grossberg (2013); Shanahan
(2012), and the relationship to object-event files in §9.3).
7.3 Ontologies
It is often useful, when describing events or processes in some domain, to represent the ontology
of the domain explicitly as a type hierarchy. Following Schorlemmer (2005) (cf. Kalfoglou and
Schorlemmer (2003, 2004)):
Definition 7.3. An ontology is a tuple O = (C,≤,⊥, |) where
(1) C is a finite set of concept symbols;
(2) ≤ is a reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric relation on C (a partial order);
(3) ⊥ is a symmetric and irreflexive relation on C (disjointness);
(4) | is symmetric relation on C (coverage)
Remark 7.2. This is a basic working definition by Schorlemmer (2005). In the case of reference
ontologies, Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer (2003) append this definition with i) a finite set R of re-
lations, and ii) a function σ : R −→ C+ assigning to each relation its arity. This corresponds to
the functor (−)+ which sends a set C to the set of finite tuples whose elements are in C (see the
example below).
In applications, the concepts in C typically characterize concrete objects in the domain, which
are brought into the theory by populating O with tokens. Let X be a set of objects to be classified
in terms of the concept symbols in C, via a classification relation A; we define a classification
A = 〈X,C,A〉, where X = Tok(A), and C = Typ(A). The relation A will have to be defined so
that ≤, ⊥, and |, are respected. This requirements lead to:
Definition 7.4. A populated ontology is a tuple O˜ = (A,≤,⊥, |) such that A = 〈X,C,A〉 is an
information flow classification, O = (A,≤,⊥, |) is an ontology, and for all x ∈ X, and c, d ∈ C, we
have:
(1) if x A c, and c ≤ d, then x A d;
(2) if x A c, and c ⊥ d, then x 1A d;
(3) if c|d, then x A c, or x A d.
A populated ontology O˜ = (A,≤,⊥, |) having A = 〈X,C,A〉, determines a local logic L =
(A,`), whose theory (C,`), is given by the smallest regular theory (i.e. the smallest theory closed
under Identity, Weakening, and Global Cut), such that for all c, d ∈ C, we have:
c ` d⇔ c ≤ d
c, d ` ⇔ c ⊥ d
` c, d⇔ c|d
(7.7)
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Example 7.1. To get an idea of what these last relations mean, take the case of a reference
ontology O = (C,R,≤,⊥, |, σ) as in Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer (2003, §4), with a set of concepts
C = {building, bird, starling}, the relation R = {isHavenFor}, arities σ(isHavenFor) = 〈building, bird〉,
where the partial order ≤, disjointness ⊥, and coverage |, are defined by the following lattice:

building bird
starling
♦
(7.8)
where  is the top and ♦ is the bottom of the lattice, i.e. building ⊥ bird and building|bird. In this
set up, we then have
building, bird `
starling ` bird
` building, bird
(7.9)
where the comma on the left-hand side has conjunctive force, whereas on the right-hand side it
has disjunctive force. Thus, with respect to set of concepts C, the above constraints declare,
respectively: nothing is both a building and a bird, all starlings are birds, and everything is either
a building or a bird.
With respect to the theory in question, the corresponding sequents are:
〈{bird, starling}, {building}〉
〈{building}, {bird, starling}〉
〈{bird}, {building, starling}〉
Then we have a classification in terms of the above sequents, as given by:
A building bird starling
〈{bird, starling}, {building}〉 0 1 1
〈{building}, {bird, starling}〉 1 0 0
〈{bird}, {building, starling}〉 0 1 0
Let the above set of sequents be denoted by X. Note how the sequents code the classification
A = 〈X,C,A〉 whereby the left-hand sides of these indicate which columns contain a ‘1’ entries,
and the right-hand sides indicate which columns contain ‘0’ entries. Assuming that X consists of
normal tokens, as in Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer (2003), we obtain a local logic L = (A,`) of the
ontology O. Given that L is a local logic on A, we have by Barwise and Seligman (1997, Prop.
12.7), that L = Lg(A); that is, with regards to Definition 6.6, L is the local logic generated by
the classification A. Associated to O is a local, populated ontology, as shown in Kalfoglou and
Schorlemmer (2003, §4), to which we refer for details.
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Example 7.2. In order to formalize semantic integration of a collection of agents in Channel
Theory, Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer (2004) propose: i) modeling populated ontologies of agents
by classifications; ii) defining the channel, its core, and infomorphisms between classifications; iii)
defining a logic on the core of the channel; and, iv) distributing the logic to the sum of agent classi-
fications to obtain the required theory for semantic interoperability within the channel. These steps
give rise to a global ontology for two candidate agents, A1 and A2, requiring semantic integration.
This commences with a distributed logic of a channel C connecting the classifications A1 and A2
that model the agents’ populated ontologies O˜1 and O˜2, respectively:
C
A1
f1
>>
f
// A2
f2
`` (7.10)
At the core of the channel C, Typ(C) covers Typ(A1) and Typ(A2), while elements of Tok(C)
connect tokens from Tok(A1) with those from Tok(A2). Effectively, the global ontology comes
about when the logic on the core of the channel is distributed to the sum of classifications A1 +A2,
for the total semantic integration of the combined events.
The structure of a typical ontology mapping may thus be seen as follows Kalfoglou and Schor-
lemmer (2003):
Or
ww ''
Oloc1
''
Oloc2
ww
Oglob
(7.11)
where Or is a reference ontology, Oloc1 ,Oloc2 are local ontologies, and Oglob is a global ontology.
7.4 Quotient channel
Given an invariant I = 〈Σ, R〉 on a classification A, the quotient channel of A by I is the limit of
the distributed system depicted by
A τI←− A/I τI−→ A. (7.12)
As a refinement of any other such channel, the quotient channel makes the following diagram
commute
C
A
g1
==
A/IτIoo
h
OO
τI // A
g2
aa (7.13)
Remark 7.3. An example is a hierarchially modular chain, where at each level of abstraction, the
tokens can be inherited, and the resulting infomorphisms are created by systematically composing
those from the levels below. As seen in Franklin and Patterson (2006) or Friedlander and Franklin
(2008), the perceptual memory relationships and actions of a typical LIDA semantic network ar-
chitecture appear to fit into this pattern.
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Remark 7.4. Ideas such as information flow, formal concepts, conceptual spaces, and local logics
can be categorically unified when they are embraced within the abstract axiomatization of an
Institution (Goguen, 2005a,b). This consists of a functor from an abstract category of ‘Signatures’
to a category of classifications that involves ‘contexts’ linked via the ‘satisfaction relation’ ().
As pointed out in Kent (2016), information flow is a particular case of FOL (which is thus one
Institution), but the classification relation between Tokens and Types abstracts the Institution
satisfaction relation between structures and sentences.
7.5 State spaces and projections
Recall that a state space is a classification S for which each token is of exactly one type, and where
the types of the space are simply the states themselves. Here a is said to be in state σ if a S σ.
The space S is complete if every state is the state of some token.
Definition 7.5. A projection f : S1 ⇒ S2 from a state space S1, to a state space S2 is given
by a covariant pair of functions, such that for each token a ∈ Tok(S1), we have f(stateS1(a)) =
stateS2(f(a)). This amounts to the commutativity of the following diagram:
Typ(S1)
f // Typ(S2)
Tok(S1)
stateS1
OO
f
// Tok(S2)
stateS2
OO
(7.14)
The composition of projections is well-defined, and so too is the Cartesian product Πi∈ISi of
indexed state spaces with natural projections
piSi : Πi∈ISi ⇒ Si, (7.15)
(see (Barwise and Seligman, 1997, §8.2)).
7.6 The Event Classification
Following the development of ideas in Barwise and Seligman (1997, Ch. 9), studies such as Kakuda
and Kikuchi (2001) define the Event Classification Evt(S) associated with a state space S as follows:
(1) Tok(Evt(S)) = Tok(S);
(2) Typ(Evt(S)) = P(Typ(S));
(3) s Evt(S) α is defined by states(s) ∈ α, for s ∈ Tok(Evt(S)) and α ∈ Typ(Evt(S));
where as before, P(·) indicates the power set.
Briefly recapping, this says that the space of events Evt(S) associated to S has as its tokens
the tokens of S and its types are arbitrary sets of sets of states of S. The classification relation
s Evt(S) α above is equivalent to stateS(s) ∈ α. Following Barwise and Seligman (1997, Prop.
8.17), given state spaces S1 and S2, the following are equivalent:
(1) f : S1 ⇒ S2 is a projection;
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(2) Evt(f) : Evt(S2)  Evt(S1) is an infomorphism.
In fact, for any state space S, the classification Evt(S) is a Boolean classification in which the
operations of taking intersection, union, and complement are here conjunction, disjunction, and
negation, respectively (Barwise and Seligman, 1997, Prop. 8.18).
Definition 7.6. Let S be a state space. The local logic generated by S, denoted Lg(S), has classi-
fication Evt(S) , regular theory Th(S), and all of its tokens are normal.
For further relationships see Barwise and Seligman (1997, 12.1 - 12.2).
Remark 7.5. Taking K = [0, 1], the evaluation relation
Evt(S): Tok(Evt(S))× Typ(Evt(S)) −→ [0, 1] (7.16)
together with (logic) infomorphisms between event classifications, may be compared with the con-
cept of a perceptual strategy as described in Hoffman, Singh and Prakash (2015).
7.7 State space systems
Considering the above ingredients we now seek a unifying principle that characterizes the state
space model and provides a suitable information channel. This motivates starting with:
Definition 7.7. A state-space system consists of an indexed family S = {fi : S⇒ Si}i∈I of state-
space projections with a common domain S, called the core of S, to state spaces Si (for i ∈ I); Si
is called the ith component space of S.
We now consider an “event” Evt as a functor that transforms a state-space system into an
information channel. Taking a pair of state spaces as an example, we first take projections:
S
fi
  
fj

Si Sj
(7.17)
Next, applying the functor Evt to this diagram yields a family of infomorphisms with a commom
domain Evt(S), yielding an information channel:
Evt(S)
Evt(Si)
Evt(fi)
99
Evt(Sj)
Evt(fj)
ee
(7.18)
State space addition produces a further commuting diagram, where for ease of notation, we write
σi for σEvt(Si), and simply f for
∑
k∈I Evt(fk):
Evt(S)
Evt(Si)
Evt(fi)
55
σi
//
∑
k∈I Evt(Sk)
f
OO
Evt(Sj)σj
oo
Evt(fj)
ii (7.19)
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Example 7.3. Following Kakuda and Kikuchi (2001, §4), let T be a regular theory, and let S be a
state space. A medium system denoted D := 〈D,N, f, p〉 between T and S, consists of the following:
(1) a state space D,
(2) a subset N of Tok(D),
(3) an infomorphism f : Cl(TTyp(T ))  Evt(D), and
(4) a projection p : D⇒ S,
where 〈Tok(D),Typ(T ),`T,N,Typ(D), stateD,−→f ,←−f 〉 forms a functional scheme. Here D is called
the medium space of D. Kakuda and Kikuchi (2001, §4) define an information channel:
Evt(D)
Cl(TTyp(T))
f
88
Evt(S)
Evt(p)
dd
(7.20)
through Evt(D) to Evt(S).
Example 7.4. Sakahara and Sato (2008, 2011) employ the concept of the core of a binary channel,
when realized as a classification, in order to describe an agent’s cognition (cf Barwise (1997)).
Consider separate source (A) and target (B) classifications, and represent the agent’s knowledge
by a regular theory T = 〈Σ,`〉. The idea is to construct a set of possible and realizable states in
several steps:
(1) For source classificationA, and target classification B, let Ω〈A,B〉 denote the set of all partitions
of Typ(A) ∪ Typ(B), called the set of states generated by A and B.
(2) The set of realizable states generated by A and B is given by
ΩR〈A,B〉 := {〈Θ,Λ〉 ∈ Ω〈A,B〉 : ∃a ∈ A, Typ(a) ⊆ Θ and, Typc(a) ⊆ Λ}, (7.21)
where the notation Typc(a) indicates the complement, i.e. everything not in Typ(a).
(3) The set of impossible states under the theory T is given by
ΩIP〈A,B|T 〉 := {〈Θ,Λ〉 ∈ Ω〈A,B〉 : Θ `T Λ}. (7.22)
The “impossibility” here is that Ω constrains a Λ with which it is disjoint.
(4) The possible states under the theory T is then
ΩP〈A,B|T 〉 = Ω〈A,B〉\ΩIP〈A,B|T 〉. (7.23)
(5) The possible and realizable states under the theory T is thus
ΩPR〈A,B|T 〉 = Ω
P
〈A,B|T 〉 ∩ ΩR〈A,B〉. (7.24)
The cognizance classification C〈A,B,T 〉 generated by A,B and T is then given by
C〈A,B,T 〉 :=
〈
ΩPR〈A,B|T 〉,Typ(A) ∪ Typ(B),C〈A,B,T〉
〉
(7.25)
where the relation C〈A,B,T 〉 is defined as 〈Θ,Λ〉 C〈A,B,T 〉 α if and only if α ∈ Θ, i.e. the choice of
Λ can be arbitrary provided it is disjoint from Θ.
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7.8 On comparing and combining the Shannon Theory of Information with
Channel Theory
Barwise (1997) recalls Shannon’s Inverse Relation between possibilities and information, basically
saying that eliminating possibilities from consideration amounts to increasing one’s information and
vice-versa. That relationship is fundamental to Dretske’s original goal of developing a semantic
theory of information based on possibilities (Dretske, 1981, 2000). Though very general as a
quantitative theory of communication flow, the original Shannon theory had largely overlooked
the question of semantic content. In any Dretske-type theory, the basis of semantic content is
in the world, i.e. in the events or situations that signals or states carry information about. By
showing how local logics are connected by information networks, channel theory provides a general
qualitative theory of information flow in this context. ‘Channels’ in the theory are more general
than the traditional idea of the Shannon communication channels (Cover and Thomas, 2006). In
Shannon’s theory, information flow in a channel is defined in terms of reduction of uncertainty
about the type of event that will occur; it says nothing about the semantics of any specific bit, i.e.
about any specific token. Channel theory specifically concerns particular tokens x and statements
of the form “x is an A.” Allwein (2004); Allwein, Moskowitz and Chang (2004) create a synthesis of
Shannon’s quantitative theory with the Barwise-Seligman qualitative theory to address the question
of how specific objects, situations and events carry information about each other.
A classification of possible outcomes of events starts with a probability space P = 〈Ω,Σ, µ〉,
where Ω denotes the set of possible outcomes, Σ is a σ-algebra on Ω whose members represent
events, and µ is a probability measure on σ representing the probability of an event having or being
associated with a particular outcome.§ We define a classification Tok(P) = Ω, Typ(P) = Σ, and
let ω P e, if and only if ω ∈ e. In this context, an infomorphism between probability spaces is
topologically a continuous map (Seligman, 2009).
To see how the basic ontology of the Shannon theory can be conveniently embedded in that of
Channel theory, note that the former’s basic unit of information is some tuple of a binary relation.
The relation is restricted to be of the form x  V , where  is regarded as a function, and V is
the value of the Token x. But closer inspection reveals this characterizes a state space in which V
is a state and tokens are ignored. In Channel Theory there are states, but tokens are not ignored
and types are values, as in §6.1. States may be amalgamated to form Events as in §7.6 and §7.7.
Channel theory permits this by firstly preserving the tokens, and then replacing states with types,
whose events are also types: for some event E, x  E, just when x  s, for some state s ∈ E
(Allwein, Moskowitz and Chang, 2004). This is basically the embedding of the one theory into the
other, and the two theories together admit a certain generalization as follows.
The presence of a sequent in an information channel (as outlined in §6.8) effectively represents
a logical gate, and this kind of structure can be seen as more general than a Markov structure (cf.
the Kolmogorov axioms in Allwein (2004); Allwein, Moskowitz and Chang (2004)), since sequents
enable the information flow to simultaneously support a flow of reasoning. Specifically, probabilities
can be assigned to sequents in A as follows. Suppose we have:
M A N ∀x(x A M ⇒ x A N), (7.26)
§Recall that a σ-algebra over Ω is a set Σ of subsets of Ω, such that ∅ ∈ Σ, Ω−e ∈ Σ, for each e ∈ Σ, and ⋃E ∈ Σ,
for each countable set E ⊆ Σ. µ is a probability measure on Σ, if and only if it satisfies the Kolmogorov axioms:
µ(∅) = 0, µ(Ω− e) = 1− µ(e), and µ(⋃E) = ∑e∈E µ(e) if E is countable, and µ(e1 ∩ e2) = 0, for all e1 6= e2 ∈ E.
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then the sequent relation ` can be weakened by removing ∀, and instead stating that for any x, we
have a probability x  N , given x M ; that is, the probability that x satisfies N given it satisfies
M . This is clearly a conditional probability, so one defines:
M PA N := P(M |N). (7.27)
Thus when the sequent’s conditional probability is p, say, we have M pA N . A priori, one must
have x A M in order to apply M A N in a argument. The probability of the former holding
in A, is P(M). Then x A N follows from the rule P(M) ·M PA N . Probability axioms for a
Countable Classical Propositional Logic are developed in Allwein (2004) (cf. Allwein, Moskowitz
and Chang (2004)) to which we refer for details. Note that information flow in distributed systems
can be interpreted dynamically; this amounts to causation in an informational context, consistent
with the Dretskean nature of the theory. In this respect, the relations between information theory
and logic are also conducive to understanding certain relations between causation and computation
(Collier, 2011; Seligman, 2009).
8 Colimits for piecing together local-to-distributed information:
Application to information flow
8.1 Cocones and Colimits
To a category theorist, minimal covers as described in §7.2 are familiar as colimits, where the
channel core C represents the vertex of a cocone (as was introduced in §6.4; more formally, see
e.g. Awodey (2010, Ch. 5)) and the existence of colimits of Chu spaces (realized here by the
classifications) has been verified (Barr, 1979). Let us briefly recall this concept with some graphic
intuition behind the idea following Baianu et al. (2006); Brown and Porter (2003).
The “input data” for a colimit is a diagram D, i.e. a collection of some objects in a category
C, together with some arrows between them, as depicted by:
. // .
D = ·
<<
""
.
ZZ
//

.
ZZ
.
(8.1)
This generalizes our use of a directed graph in §6.4 by allowing the “vertices” and “edges” of D to
be objects and morphisms of an arbitrary category. Next we need ‘functional controls’ comprising
a cocone with base D and vertex an object C in C,
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C.
GG
// .
zz
WW
D .
88
AA
&&
.
dd
//
zz
OO
.
cc
[[
.
JJ (8.2)
such that each of the triangular faces of the cocone is commutative. The “output” from D will
be an object colim(D) in our category C defined by a special colimit cocone, such that any cocone
on D factors uniquely through the colimit cocone. Effectively, the commutativity condition on the
cocone induces, in the colimit, an interaction of images from different parts of the diagram D. The
uniqueness condition makes the colimit the optimal solution to this factorisation problem.
Let us set
 = colim(D) (8.3)
where the dotted arrows in the diagram below represent new morphisms which combine to make
the colimit cocone:
C
colim(D) = 
Φ
88
.
kk
HH
// .
ll
zz
VV
D ·
OO
66
AA
((
.
bb
dd
//
zz
OO
.
cc
jj
ZZ
.
KK
[[
(8.4)
and for which the broken arrow Φ is constructed by requiring commutativity for all of the triangular
faces of the combined diagram. Next, stripping away the ‘old’ cocone results in a factorisation of
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the cocone via the colimit:
C
colim(D) = 
Φ
88
.
kk
// .
ll
zzD ·
OO
66
((
.
bb
dd
//
zz
.
cc
jj
.
[[
(8.5)
Intuitively, the process can be seen as follows. The object colim(D) is pieced together from the
diagram D by means of the colimit cocone. From beyond D, an arbitrary object C in C ‘sees’ D as
mediated through its colimit. This means that if C is going to interact with all of D, then it does
so via colim(D). The colimit cocone can be thought of as a kind of program: given any cocone on
D with vertex C, the output will be a morphism
Φ : colim(D)→ C (8.6)
as constructed from the other data. ¶
Example 8.1. Brown and Porter (2003) provide an analogy comparing colimits with how an email
message can be relayed. Suppose E denotes some email document. This is to be sent via a server
S, which decomposes E into numerous parts Ei (i ∈ I, an indexing set), and labels each part Ei,
so it becomes E′i. These labelled parts E
′
i are then sent to a number of servers Si, which then relay
these messages as newly labelled messages E′′i to a server SC , for the receiver C. The server SC
then combines the E′′i to produce the recovered message ME at C. Breaking the message down and
routing it through the Si appears arbitrary, but the system is designed such that ME is independent
of all choices made at each step of the process.
Many other illustrative examples applying colimits to computer science, social systems, and
neuroscience, can be seen in Baianu et al. (2006); Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch (2007); Healy
and Caudell (2006); Healy (2010).
8.2 Coordinated channels in ontologies
Suppose we have two prospectively interoperating agents A1, A2, with each agent Ai (i = 1, 2)
having its knowledge represented according to its own conceptualization, as specified in relationship
to its ontology Oi, respectively. This means that a concept of O1 will, a priori, be considered
¶The diagrams included in (8.1)–(8.5) are reproduced from Baianu et al. (2006); Brown and Porter (2003), with
permission from R. Brown
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semantically distinct from O2, even if they are equivalent syntactically. However, the behavior of
the agents can provide evidence for a meaning common to A1 and A2. Let us us assume that the
agents’ ontologies are not open to a third-party inspection. Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer (2004)
use a channel to coordinate the populated ontologies (cf. §7.3) O˜1, O˜2 by capturing the degree
of participation of each agent in communicative behaviors. Specifically, i) agent Ai attempts to
“explain” a subset of its concepts to other agents, and ii) other agents exchange with Ai some of
their own tokens, thus increasing the set of tokens originally available to Ai.
To see how this degree of participation can be captured by Channel Theory, Kalfoglou and
Schorlemmer (2004) introduce classifications Ai = 〈Tok(Ai),Typ(Ai),Ai〉, corresponding to the
agents Ai, respectively, along with subclassifications A
′
i = 〈Tok(A′i),Typ(A′i),A′i〉, and infomor-
phisms gi : A
′
i −→ Ai, for which functions gˆi and gˇi are the inclusions Typ(A′i) ⊆ Typ(Ai) and
Tok(A′i) ⊆ Tok(Ai), respectively. It is from the subclassifications A′i arising from the interactions
that coordination is established. Thus we have the following information channel with core (i.e.
cocone) C′:
C′
A1 A
′
1g1
oo
f1
>>
A′2
f2
``
g2
// A2
(8.7)
The optimal coordinated channel that captures semantic integration achieved by the agents is then
represented by the colimit C′ = colim{A′1 ← S→ A′2} of the diagram linking the subclassifications
that model the agents’ participation in the interoperation:
C′
A1 A
′
1g1
oo
f1
>>
S
h1
oo
h2
// A′2
f2
``
g2
// A2
(8.8)
“Optimality” here means that every other channel induces a map to C′ when commutativity is
required.
Part II: Applications to Perception and Cognition
9 Perception, categorization and attention as neurocognitive pro-
cesses
We now turn from the assembly of category-theoretic tools as presented in Part I, to the applica-
tion of these tools to modelling object recognition and categorization, particularly the recognition
and categorization of mereologically-complex entities. We first review the basic cognitive neuro-
science of object recognition and categorization in vision, currently the best understood of the
sensory channels. We focus on the data structures employed – what Marr (1982) called the algo-
rithmic/representational level of analysis – with some pointers to the relevant implementation-level
neuroscience (see Fields (2013) for a review of implementation details).
37
9.1 Dual-process vision and object files
The primate, and in particular human, visual system comprises two early processing pathways,
a dorsal pathway specialized for the rapid processing of location and motion information, and a
ventral pathway specialized for static (e.g. shape, size, texture and color) feature information
(reviewed by Goodale and Milner (1992); Flombaum, Scholl and Santos (2008); Fields (2011); see
Cloutman (2013) for a discussion of interactions between these pathways and Alain et al. (2001)
and Sathian et al. (2011) for evidence that auditory and haptic perception, respectively, have a
similar dual-stream organization). Perception of a located, featured object requires processing by
both pathways followed by fusion of the intermediate partial representations they produce.
Studies of visual object tracking over short time periods consistently show that trajectory
information dominates static feature information in determining object identity (Flombaum, Scholl
and Santos, 2008; Fields, 2011). Kahneman, Triesman and Gibbs (1992) termed the initial, transient
representation of a moving object in visual short-term memory the “object file” (see also Treisman
(2006)). As under ordinary circumstances all objects are effectively moving due to visual saccades,
object files are at least typically initiated by dorsal-stream processing. Static feature information
extracted from the relevant part of the visual field by ventral-stream processing is then bound to
this initially motion-based representation. These processing steps require 50 – 100 ms in humans,
much shorter than the time required for reportable visual awareness of the object.
The object file is the fundamental “token” representation of a located, bounded, featured entity
that is distinguished from the “background” of a visual scene. It represents where the object
is, its visually-identifiable features, and its instantaneous trajectory during the time window ∆t
from object-file initiation to feature binding. All further information about the object is added
by downstream processing; in particular, whether the object is novel or something previously
encountered, either as a type or as a specific individual, must be computed from information
available in memory.
9.2 Feature-category binding and object tokens
Object files are implemented in a content-dependent way across the posterior temporal cortex
(Martin, 2007; Mahon and Caramazza, 2009; Fields, 2013); features of entities perceived as agents
or non-agents, for example, are encoded in the lateral or medial, respectively, fusiform gyrus (Fig.
1). This distributed, content-dependent encoding indicates that top-down category information,
e.g. agent versus non-agent, is already active in the binding of location and motion information to
feature information at the level of the object file.
38
Fig. 1 : Simplified functional architecture of visual object perception within the tempo-
ral lobe. Abbreviations are: MT, medial temporal area; STS, superior temporal sulcus;
MTG, medial temporal gyrus; PHC, parahippocampal cortex; V4, visual area 4 (occip-
ital cortex); MFG, medial fusiform gyrus; LFG, lateral fusiform gyrus; PRC, perirhinal
cortex; HC, hippocampus; ATP, anterior temporal pole. Solid lines are feedforward;
dashed lines feedback. Adapted from Fields (2013).
The functional architecture supporting object representation and object-directed attention is
already present at birth (see e.g. Gao et al. (2015); Huang et al (2015) for neuroarchitectural and
Johnson and Hannon (2015) for behavioral evidence) and its functionality rapidly matures toward
adult levels during the first two years. Visual feature identification, segregation of co-moving,
conjoined objects, and the complementary process of grouping co-moving, non-conjoined objects, for
example, are highly dependent on top-down, memory-driven categorization or, in Bayesian terms,
expectation confirmation or disconfirmation. Four- to six-month old human infants, for example,
typically do not segregate static or co-moving conjoined objects that older infants, children or adults
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do segregate, but quickly learn to do so when the objects are separately manipulated (Johnson and
Hannon, 2015). Young infants similarly fail to group co-moving, non-conjoined objects (i.e. fail to
perform “object completion”) that older infants, children or adults do group, with the exception of
point-light walkers exhibiting biological motion, which infants perceive as single entities from the
earliest ages tested (Johnson and Hannon (2015); see Schlesinger et al. (2012) for a replication of
a canonical object completion experiment in the iCub robot).
Young infants exhibit robust object memory, particularly for familiar faces, and emotional re-
sponses to objects, again from the earliest ages tested. Feelings of familiarity and their attendant
emotions correlate with feature-based object recognition at the level of perirhinal cortex (Eichen-
baum, Yonelinas and Ranganath, 2007). Memory for a particular, re-identifiable object requires
a memory-resident representation of the individual object, what Zimmer and Ecker (2010) have
termed the “object token.” Recognizing a novel object as a distinct, individual thing involves en-
coding a new object token specifically for it. Recognition or re-identification of the same individual
object on a later occassion is then a process of matching the current object file to this previously-
encoded object token (Fig. 2). This process is, in general, not straightforward, as object features,
behaviors, and locations may change between encounters; both feature matching and, after about
four years of age, the construction of unobserved and hence fictive causal histories (FCHs) of objects
are employed to establish individual object identity across observations (Fields, 2012). Enabling
object recognition across feature, behavior, and context changes requires object tokens to have a
“core” of essential properties that change only slowly through time. The distinction between core
and variable properties in object tokens is category-dependent and not well understood.
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Fig. 2 : Identifying an object as the same individual across time requires matching a
current object file to a memory-resident object token. Both feature matching and the
construction of unobserved (fictive) causal histories (FCHs) are employed to link object
tokens across observations.
Eichenbaum, Yonelinas and Ranganath (2007) emphasize that categorization by type precedes
object-token matching; e.g. an individual person is typically recognized as a person before they
are identified as a particular individual person. The feeling of familiarity is generated already at
the level of type recognition; Eichenbaum, Yonelinas and Ranganath (2007) consider the example
of recognizing a person as a person, as a specific individual person encountered before, and only
after some deliberation as a known, named, individual person represented by a memory-resident
object token. How the relationship between categories and object tokens as components of semantic
memory is implemented at the neural circuit level, i.e. the details of the circuitry connecting ATP
and PRC in Fig. 1, is not well understood. While both categorization and individual recognition
are generally assumed to be implemented by some form of Bayesian predictive coding (Friston,
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2010; Maloney and Zhang, 2010), how categorization constrains or guides object token matching in
particular cases is also not well characterized. The category - to - object token satisfaction relation
 remains, in other words, an empirical question for each particular type-token pair.
9.3 Context perception, event files and episodic memories
Objects are invariably recognized in some context, typically one involving other recognized or at
least categorized objects. The spatial “where” information processed by the dorsal stream (cf.
Fig. 1) provides the “container” for this context as well as the relative locations and motions of
objects within it. Contexts typically, however, also include “how” and “why” information, largely
derived by processing pathways in parietal cortex (Fields, 2013), that represent inferences about
mechanical and intentional causation, respectively. As in the case of object categorization and
individual object-token encoding, these causal inference capabilities are present in rudimentary form
in early infancy, and develop rapidly over the first two years (Baillargeon et al., 2012; Johnson and
Hannon, 2015). Context assembly has been mapped to parahippocampal cortex, with object token
to context binding implemented by the hippocampus (Eichenbaum, Yonelinas and Ranganath, 2007;
Fields, 2013). Hommel (2004) has termed the fully-bound representation of interacting objects in
context an “event file”; these representations mediate event understanding and context-dependent
action planning. Event files are the least complex visual representations that typically enter human
awareness; hence they can be considered to be implemented by coherent activity at the level of
the GNW (cf. Remark 7.1 ; for specific GNW-based models of awareness, see Baars and Franklin
(2003); Dehaene and Changeux (2004); Baars, Franklin and Ramsoy (2013); Dehaene, Charles and
King (2014); see also Franklin and Patterson (2006); Franklin et al. (2012) for discussions of LIDA
as a robotic architecture based on GNW design principles).
Event files correspond to “episodes” in episodic memory, again a hippocampus-centered function
(Eichenbaum, Yonelinas and Ranganath, 2007; Rugg and Vilberg, 2013). As sequences of episodic
memories typically contain many of the same “players” – including in particular the self (Renoult
et al., 2012) – they pose a particular problem for object-token updating. Each episodic memory
must contain at least some episode-specific details – e.g. what a particular person was wearing –
in addition to the “core” identifying information for each included object token. Linking episodic
memories into a temporal sequence requires maintaining this “core” – which it is useful to consider as
a “singular category” with just one member – while modifying its “essential” identifying information
for the represented object as needed, e.g. updating a person’s age or personality characteristics (Fig.
3). This maintenance process is effectively the construction of a history or model of the individual
represented by the object token, the FCH discussed above (Fields, 2012). Episodic memory recall
and reconsolidation can modify the properties associated with or even the presence of the object
tokens referenced by the memory, demonstrating the fragility of such FCHs (Schwabe, Nader and
Pruessner, 2014). Infants are capable of episodic recall over short periods – e.g. the time periods
required for experiments assaying causal inference – but have limited recall and reconsolidation
ability over longer periods (Hayne, 2004; Bauer, 2006). Hence infants can be expected not to
maintain robust object histories until about age four, the age when “childhood amnesia” typically
ends.
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Fig. 3 : a) Object token updating following a new event involving a recognized object.
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The singular category specifying the object’s “core” identifying criteria constrains the
recognition and updating processes. b) Updating the constraint information in a object-
specifying singular category given a sequence of episodic memories and a new event.
Such updates must be infrequent compared to object token updates to maintain coherent
identification criteria. Adapted from Fields (2012).
Episodic memories can also reference object tokens for individuated and categorized but other-
wise unidentified objects, e.g. “some other people” present at a meeting or “other cars” involved
in an accident. These “other” objects may appear in no other episodic memories and have no
associated histories; they are represented by effectively one-off object tokens that are required by
the data structure but play no other role in the system. The human ability to learn to recognize
new individuals indicates that such minimally filled-out object tokens are available for matching
new incoming object files; however, their lifetime and the extent and context-dependence of their
availability remain poorly understood.
9.4 Attention, salience and Bayesian precision
Systems with limited cognitive resources must allocate processing to the inputs most likely to be
important. In the current setting, this corresponds to paying attention to some objects and not
others. Attentional control in primates is implemented by competing, cross-modulating dorsal (top-
down, goal-driven, proactive) and ventral (bottom-up, percept-driven, reactive) attention systems
(Goodale, 2014; Vossel, Geng and Fink, 2014). The “salience network” that controls these attention
systems develops in concert with the medial-temporal object recognition network, starting from
earliest infancy (Gao et al., 2015; Uddin, 2015).
Baysian predictive coding has long been employed as a model of perceptual processing from
early vision through categorization and individual object identification (Friston, 2010; Maloney
and Zhang, 2010). Bastos et al. (2012) review structural and functional evidence that predictive
coding is implemented at the level of local microcircuits comprising cortical minicolumns, the
dominant architectural units in mammalian cortex, as well as at the larger scales of functional
networks responsible for trajectory recognition, categorization or object-token matching. This
use of the same or similar processing methods at different scales, as well as the overall hierarchical
organization of perceptual processing (Van Essen, Anderson and Felleman, 1992), suggests the kind
of association between scale and coarse-graining introduced in §5; we will return to this connection
below.
In a Bayesian predictive coding system, attentional control can be modelled by varying the
precision assigned to inputs and expectations. In the Bayesian “active inference” framework of
Friston (2010), relatively high-precision inputs drive the revision of expectations and model reac-
tive, ventral attention, while relatively high-precision expectations drive input-changing behavior
and model proactive dorsal attention. The framework also allows direct alterations of precision as-
signments as inferential outcomes. The adaptive resonance (ART) framework of Grossberg (2013)
provides a functionally similar model of attentional control, although its motivation and underlying
ideas are distinct from those of Friston (2010) and its state-updating rules are not Bayesian. When
viewed as implementations of constraint hierarchies, however, both Bayesian active inference and
ART exhibit the deep duality discussed in §10.4 below. It is this duality, we will argue, that makes
them useful models of attentional control.
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10 Tokens, types and information flow in perception and catego-
rization
While the human classification of perceived objects into cognitive categories corresponding to
verbally-expressible concepts like “person” or “house” forms part of the motivation for the work
of Dretske (1981); Barwise and Perry (1983); Barwise and Seligman (1997) and others reviewed in
Part I, category-theoretic methods have yet to be applied to the analysis of these processes at the
level of detail reviewed in §9. This formal treatment of ontologies discussed in §7.3, for example,
does not explicitly address the question of how ontologies are constructed or maintained through
time in the face of new observations. We begin in this section to develop the constructs needed for
more complete models. We introduce the idea of a Cone-Cocone Diagram (CCCD) to capture the
deep duality evident in the bidirectional flow of constraints between perception and categorization.
10.1 Representing object files in a Chu space
The fundamental perceptual token, the initial representation of a discrete perceptual entity, is the
object file. As outlined in §9.1 above, an object file binds a collection of static features such as size,
shape, texture and color extracted by ventral-stream processing to “instantaneous” (i.e. within
∆t) location and trajectory information extracted by dorsal stream processing. Let F1 . . . Fn be
a finite tuple of static features, each of which can have any one of m distinct values; e.g. if Fi is
‘color’ its distinct values are the colors distinguishable by the visual system of interest. We can
then consider a finite binary array F = [fij ], where fij = 1 for some object if and only if feature Fi
of that object has its jth possible value. We can similarly consider finite binary arrays X = [xijk] of
discrete instantaneous three-dimensional locations and V = [vijk] of discrete instantaneous three-
dimensional velocities. We will restrict attention to the case in which every object has some value
for every perceptible feature, a single instantaneous location, and a single instantaneous velocity.
In this case, we can characterize an object file as an instance of the finite array [F,X, V ]. These
instances form a finite set {Oi}.
The most fundamental abstraction implemented by the visual system is object permanence,
i.e. the maintenance of object identity over time (Fields, 2017). At the level of the object file,
the relevant timeframe for object permanence is a “view” lasting between half a second and a
few seconds. Objects that remain fully or even partially visible during a view are considered to
remain “the same thing” while seen. Whether an object that does not remain visible is perceived
as remaining “the same thing” during a view depends on the age of the perceiver (less or more than
1 year) and the details of its occluded trajectory. Objects moving sufficiently fast are “seen” as
persistent even if their features, e.g. size, shape or color, vary over considerable ranges (Flombaum,
Scholl and Santos, 2008).
Let {Ci} be the finite set of finite (indeed short) sequences of object files that are treated by
the cognitive system of interest as indicating object permanence during the course of a single view.
The elements of {Ci} are then natural “types” relative to the “tokens” in the set {Oi} of possible
object files; an element Ci ∈ {Ci} can be though of as “associating” a sequence of object files into
a single abstracted representation. Hence we can consider
Ci = ({Oi},P , {Ci}) (10.1)
to be a Chu space, where here P is the empirically-determined relation “consistent with object
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permanence” defined on sequences of object files. This Chu space clearly describes a Classification
in the sense of Barwise and Seligman (1997) as stated in §6.1. Note that an element of {Ci} may not
be a concept in the sense of §3.1, as the value of every feature as well as the position and velocity
can, at least in principle, change between every object token contributing to the perception of a
persistent object.
The association of object files into an element of {Ci} adds top-down, expectation-based infor-
mation about identity over time to the “raw” information of perception. This added information
may, in fact, be incorrect; trajectories that appear to preserve object identity may involve distinct
objects, while those that appear not to preserve object identity may involve a single object (Fields,
2011). More subtly, association into an element of {Ci} also subtracts information by suppressing
motion information relative to feature information. While trajectory information dominates fea-
ture information in determining which sequences of object files to associate, persistent objects are
required to have persistent features, at least during the course of short, single-view interactions
(Baillargeon, 2008). Conferring persistence on an object converts its motion into a categorizable
“behavior” that the object may or may not execute on other occasions.
10.2 From object files to object tokens and object histories
Persistent objects are the “entities” in the common-sense ontology humans typically develop in late
infancy. These entities participate in episodic memories and are represented by object tokens and,
if they recur sufficiently often to be recognized as persistent, by singular categories and (largely
fictive) histories. As with the abstraction of persistence, these successive levels of abstraction both
add and subtract information. Types at one level of abstraction, in particular, become tokens at
the next.
As representations of persistent objects, object tokens can be identified with elements of the set
{Ci}. Such tokens are, at their construction, already instances of multiple types (Fig. 4). Persistent
objects are instances, first, of the types representing their visually-identified features. They are,
second, classified automatically by threat detection, agency detection and animacy detection sys-
tems active beginning in early infancy (Fields, 2014); the presence of a face alone indicates agency
to human infants. They are also classified, when possible, into entry-level and then more abstract
cognitive categories, an ability also developed in infancy (Rakison and Yermoleva, 2010). These
token - type relationships can be represented as Classifications, as is standard in the literature (e.g.
Barwise and Seligman (1997)), and as we have surveyed here. Recognition of an object by type
generates a feeling of familiarity with the type; e.g. seeing a cat generates a feeling of familiarity
with cats.
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Fig. 4 : An object token is classified at construction into multiple types by distinct
but cross-modulating processes. These include animacy and agency detection, emotion-
mediated threat detection, and entry-level followed by superordinate and subordinate
categorization into “type” of object.
Here, however, we are primarily interested in the re-identification of individual objects, i.e. the
creation of an association indicating identity, and hence persistence over time, between an object
token constructed now and one constructed previously. At the object token level, the relevant
timeframes for persistence range from the few seconds separating views to the decades separating
a high-school graduation from a 50th reunion.
Let Ci(t1), Cj(t2), ...Ck(tn) be a sequence of n object tokens encountered at successive times.
Recognizing successive object tokens as tokens of the very same individual thing involves at least the
two processes discussed in §9.3 above, i.e. matching to a set of core features composing a singular
category and linking via FCH construction, with the uncertainty associated with both increasing
with the time between perceptual encounters. Let Dl[t1, tn] comprise both the singular category
and the FCH that together confer persistence on the object-token sequence Ci(t1), Cj(t2), ...Ck(tn),
and let {Dl[t1, tn]} be the set of all such representations over sequences of elements of {Ci} indexed
by observation times in the closed interval [t1, tn]. The elements of {Dl[t1, tn]} are, once again,
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natural “types” for the object tokens over which they are defined. Hence we can consider a Chu
space or Classification (in the sense of §6.1) Ai[t1, tn] as given by:
Ai[t1, tn] := 〈{Ci[t1, tn]}, {Di[t1, tn]},P [t1, tn]〉 (10.2)
where P [t1, tn] is the empirically-determined relation “consistent with object permanence” defined
on sequences of object tokens between t1 and tn.
The set of time-indexed representations {Dl}[t1, tn] can be conceptualized more abstractly by
noting that at each tj , the set of possible object tokens {Ci(tj)} is also the set of types of a
classification. For each single time step tj −→ tk, the persistence criterion P [tj , tk] induces
maps – what we have called FCHs – between pairs of object tokens that can be consistently
considered to be tokens of the same individual object (Fig. 5a). These FCHs, together with the
maps (here assumed to be identities) linking the singular categories for persistent objects, can be
considered infomorphisms between the underlying classifications at tj and tk. It is then natural
to interpret the set {Dl}[tj , tk] as a channel between the underlying classifications; this channel
comprises, intuitively, the (assumed constant) singular categories and the constructed FCHs (Fig.
5b). Extending the process of linking object tokens by FCHs forward in time results in a hierarchy
of channels, with the most temporally-extended channel as the colimit (Fig. 5c). The colimit
cocone {Di}[t1, tn] admits a vertex classification, which we denote Ci (with time interval [t1, tn]
understood). Recall that this Ci is induced by a complex of infomorphisms:
· · · −→ Ai[t1, tn] −→ Ai+1[t1, tn] −→ · · · (10.3)
as depicted in (6.7). We will refer to such diagrams {Di}[t1, tn] as “Cocone Diagrams” or CCDs
extending for a specified time interval, e.g. t1...tn in Fig. 5c.
a)
SCi(tj)
Id // SCi(tk)
OTi(tj)
Inst
OO
OTi(tk)FCH
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b)
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c)
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dd
Fig. 5 : a) Interpreting sequential object tokens as representing the same persistent
individual constructs an FCH to link them. The FCH is depicted as acting backwards
in time as it is built from the new observation to the old one. Here SCi(tj) denotes
Singular Category i at tj , OTi(tj) denotes Object Token i at tj , etc. Id = Identity, and
Inst = Instance. b) Families of FCHs link sets {Ci}(tj) of object tokens instantiated
at different times. The set {Di}[tj , tk] of abstracted singular category plus FCH pairs
representing objects persistent from tj to tk can be viewed as a channel between sets of
linked object tokens. c) A CCD representing an object history during a time interval
t1...tn. The set {Di}[t1, tn] is a colimit cocone for sequences of object tokens consistent
with persistence from t1 to tn.
The “essential” identifying properties of objects can change over time, though they cannot all
change together without causing identification failure. In the case of human beings, for example,
both (approximate) age and core personality characteristics are identifying properties; hence a child
with an adult friend’s personality is not identified as one’s adult friend. Slow, asynchronous changes
in the composition of singular categories and hence small departures from identity of the linking
maps between them do not alter the structures of the above diagrams. Such changes do, however,
render FCH construction more difficult.
10.3 Contexts, event files and episodic memories
Objects are never encountered in complete isolation; even the most austere psychophysics exper-
iments have a computer screen and the surrounding laboratory as a context. In real-life settings,
objects are typically encountered in interacting groups. Object tokens have, therefore, lateral syn-
chronic associations as well as the diachronic links implemented by FCHs. The event-file construct
of Hommel (2004) provides a “snapshot” of such associations over the few-second to few-minute
timeframes intuitively regarded as single “events.” Event files capture interactions between objects
as well as their significance and affective consequences for the observer. These kinds of information
provide crucial input into the FCH construction processes that allow the objects participating in
the event to be identified (Eichenbaum, Yonelinas and Ranganath, 2007; Zimmer and Ecker, 2010;
Fields, 2012).
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Event files as defined by Hommel (2004) are effectively tokens; each represents a discrete event
that can be encoded and then retrieved as a discrete episodic memory. Single events are by defi-
nition localized in time and hence cannot be repeated; recalling an event and hence (partially and
perhaps inaccurately) reconstructing an event file, in particular, occurs in a current context and
itself constitutes a distinct event. The recognition of event types as such is not well characterized
experimentally. It seems reasonable to expect, however, that events tokens (i.e. events files) and
event types form classifications under the action of a satisfaction relation that maps tokens to
types. We consider this further in §11 below in the broader context of mereological complexity and
reasoning.
10.4 Learning new categories and Cone-Cocone Diagrams
With high frequency in infancy and childhood but typically reduced frequency thereafter, humans
encounter not just individual objects, but object types that they have never encountered before.
Humans often learn to recognize such novelties from just one “training” encounter. Understanding
how humans achieve such one-shot learning is a major challenge for cognitive neuroscience, just
as replicating this ability is a major challenge for machine learning. Besides achieving efficient,
preferably one-shot learning from exemplars, the problem has (at least) two additional components:
recognizing novelty and switching from classification mode to learning mode. As Oudeyer, Baranes
and Kaplan (2013) have emphasized, it is learnable novelty that must be recognized; otherwise
precious resources are wasted on attempts to learn the unlearnable.
Consider a novel object that is easily classified as an instance of a familiar entry-level category:
a novel cat, for example. The object is recognized as novel because its object token does not
match any existing singular category, cannot be linking to any existing object token by a plausible
FCH, or both. Interacting with the object over an extended period (several views, a few minutes)
or encountering it again after a short delay allows certain of its properties to be identified as
unchanging; in the case of a cat, these may include size, shape, color pattern, face and voice but
not location or behavior. The (short) sequence of distinct object tokens recorded during such
interactions serves, in other words, to associate some properties of the object into a provisional
singular category. The principle of association here is, once again, persistence: each successive
object token indicates the object as persistent, and the features encoded by object tokens in the
sequence are similar enough to be treated as identical.
We can, in this case, consider the distinct feature instances encoded by the distinct object
tokens in the sequence to be feature “tokens” and consider the object tokens themselves, which the
criterion of persistence identifies as representing one individual object, as jointly defining a “type”
that organizes those tokens. The construction employed in §10.1 above can then be employed to
construct a classification of these tokens into these types. This classification is the Chu-space dual
of the classification of object tokens by singular categories shown in Fig. 5a.
The requirement of a familiar entry-level category can now be relaxed: suppose that what is
encountered is not a novel cat, but an entirely novel animal, perhaps a pangolin or a platypus.
In this case an entirely category must be learned. However novel the object encountered is, it
must have some familiar features, e.g. its approximate size and shape, whether it has a face,
perhaps some aspect of its behavior. Even very young infants can use features of these kinds
to initiate classification and identify novelty (Rakison and Yermoleva, 2010). Placement in any
familiar category allows the construction of a singular category as outlined above. Construction of
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a non-singular category – e.g. [pangolin] – merely requires abstraction, i.e. allowance of inexact
matches.
The problem of maintaining a singular category across changes in essential features introduced
in §10.2 above can now be seen as a special case of category learning. A singular category is robust
against feature changes if the FCHs linking its instances are strong enough that persistence at the
object token level can induce persistence at the singular category level. The “flow of association” in
this case is the reverse of that depicted in Fig. 5c; the properties composing the singular category
are in this case the “tokens” that are held together by the persistent object history as a “type.”
Reversing the arrows in a CCD (e.g. Fig. 5c) yields a cone, the dual of a cocone. A system
capable of both object history construction and its dual, category learning with singular category
maintenance as a special case, is thus characterized by a cone-cocone diagram (CCCD); such a
diagram can be represented by making all of the arrows in a CCD such as Fig. 5c double-headed.
Continuing the notation used in Fig. 5c, we denote the corresponding CCCD by Dgi[t1, tn].
A CCCD captures the simultaneous upward and downward flow of constraints that characterize
human vision and, it is reasonable to suppose, other sensory modalities both functionally and neuro-
architecturally (Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002). The duality expressed by a CCCD is the duality
found between dorsal and ventral attention systems, or between high-precision expectations and
high-precision inputs in an active inference system. It resolves the central paradox of familiarity:
that familiarity can confer either high or low salience in a context-dependent way. The “switch”
between these dual constraint flows appears to be implemented, in humans, by the amygdala -
insula - cingulate axis at the core of the salience network (e.g. Uddin (2015)).
10.5 Local logics embedded in CCCDs
Recall that any classification generates a natural local logic in accordance with Definition 6.6, and
that Barwise and Seligman (1997, Prop. 12.7) ensures that any local logic defined on a classification
can be identified with the local logic generated by the classification (cf. Example 7.1). These ideas
can now be applied to the classifications defined above to characterize the categorization and
identity maintenance processes in terms of the actions of local logics.
To begin, we can immediately apply the principle of Definition 6.6 to (10.1) relating “instanta-
neous” object files (tokens) to short sequences of object files (types) indicating object permanence,
to obtain a local logic Lg(Ci) with regular theory Th(Ci) = ({Ci},`). This Th(Ci) = ({Ci},`)
expresses the effective criteria for short-term object permanence and hence captures, albeit im-
plicitly, an important part of the semantics of “object” for the system it describes. Likewise, in
(10.2), we have a local logic Lg(Ai[t1, tn]) with regular theory Th(Ai[t1, tn]) = ({Di}[t1, tn],`) (for
each i) that captures the effective criteria for longer-term object permanence and hence additional
components of the semantics of “object.” In both cases all tokens are normal (see Definition 6.6).
On recalling Definition 6.7, we can take as a working principle that sequences such as in (10.3) are
logic infomorphisms satisfying the properties of Barwise and Seligman (1997, 12.3). Accordingly,
an underlying semantic structure is built into Fig. 5c, and hence to the ensuing CCCD diagram
Dgi[t1, tn].
Sequents serve purposes in this development. On the one hand, they are implicitly assumed in
the preceding discussion (see also §6.8 and §7.3). On the other hand, we recall from §7.8 that on
relaxing the sequent relation ` to a conditional probability (see (7.27)), we see how a sequence of
logic infomorphisms may function as a chain of Bayesian inferences. This is consistent with the use
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of Bayesian methods reviewed in §9.4, and suggests that the diagrams Dgi[t1, tn] may be considered
as effective carriers of Bayesian inference through sequences of episodic memories, and idea that is
extended in §11 below.
As regards ontologies, we recall that both types {Ci} and {Di}[t1, tn] are not strictly sets of
(formal) concept symbols. We suggest that a weaker sense of ontology is obtainable on assum-
ing the relations ≤, ⊥, | in Definition 7.3. Generally, however, we can acknowledge the viewpoint
of Kalfoglou and Schorlemmer (2003) which sees the local logics themselves as characterizing on-
tologies. This derivative sense of ontology is useful for our purposes since ontological partitions
into “entities” tend to induce “spatial” boundaries around conceptual and/or perceptual partitions
Smith (1996). Such induced boundaries can be identified with coarse-grainings and hence induced
geometries, as will be discussed in §11.3 below.
11 Parts and wholes: Using Chu spaces and information channels
to represent mereological complexity
The Formal Ontology introduced by Husserl (1970) developed a theory of “parts” and “wholes”
towards a foundation for mereological reasoning, a methodology that also has roots in the works of
Aristotle, Brentano, Whitehead, and others (as reviewed and developed in Casati and Varzi (1999);
Lando (2017); Les´niewski (1929); Simons (1987); Smith (1996)). Formalizations of mereological
reasoning (e.g. Casati and Varzi (1999); Smith (1996)) have found wide application in geographic
information systems (GIS) and formal ontologies. The implementation of mereological reasoning
in humans is not, however, well understood; indeed we have been able to find only a single neu-
roimaging study explicitly comparing mereological and functional classifications (Muehlhaus et al.,
2014). As mereological reasoning appears specifically to fail in the “weak central coherence” phe-
notype of autism spectrum conditions (Happe´ and Frith, 2006), understanding its implementation
is potentially of clinical relevance.
11.1 Perceptual identification of mereologically-complex objects
The macroscopic objects perceptible by humans are by definition mereologically complex: they
have multiple perceptible parts, each of which has further parts, etc. Such objects can, moreover,
be assembled into larger complexes, with perceptual scenes being ubiquitous, transient examples.
Many such larger complexes are, however, not transient but rather meaningful, persistent objects
in their own right. A fundamental challenge posed by human object perception is to understand
what mereological complexes are perceived as “whole” objects, how object tokens representing such
complexes are constructed, and how such object tokens are linked into persistent histories despite
changes in the properties and even identities of the “parts” making up the complex.
A specific example of a mereological hierarchy is shown in Fig. 6. Individual human beings,
such as author CF, are entry-level (EL) objects and hence are represented by EL object tokens.
Human beings are inevitably members of larger complexes, including families, extended families,
tribes, ethnic groups, nations, etc. The smaller instances of such complexes (e.g. human nuclear
families) can be directly perceived; larger instances may not be perceptible but can be referred to
using language, images, and abstract graphics. Hence object tokens can be constructed for such
complexes. Object tokens representing “parts” such as CF are naturally linked to object tokens
representing complexes, such as CF’s family, by “part of” relations. Such relations similarly link
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parts of CF to CF. Entry-level objects appear to play a special role in such hierarchies; “part of”
links are transitive both above and below EL objects, but not across EL objects. A part of CF is
not a part of CF’s family, just as a part of a car is not a part of a fleet of cars.
Fig. 6 : Example of an object token (OT) hierarchy extending both above and below a
mereologically-complex entry-level (EL) object, one of the present authors (CF). Each
OT has an associated singular category (SC) specifying identifying static and behavioral
features. These SCs are in turn associated with general categories, some of which are
shown here. Solid arrows show typical “part of”, “has a” and “is a” links. Dashed
arrows show induced part of links; red “X” indicated the failure of “part of” transitivity
across the EL OT.
Hierarchies of tokens linked by “part of” relations are commonplace in AI systems. The ex-
istence of such “part of” hierarchies raises, however, the questions of what the “part of” relation
is, how it is established, and how it is maintained over time. The correspondence between object
tokens and singular categories provides a partial answer: “part of” relations between object tokens
correspond to “has a” relations between singular categories, which in turn correspond to “has a”
relations between general categories (Fig. 6). While the object token is the locus of learning for
the first exemplars of EL objects encountered in infancy and childhood, once a general category
has been learned the “part of” links between new object tokens can be induced by inter-category
“has a” links. The mechanisms by which such link induction is implemented remain to be eluci-
dated; we consider formal structures supporting this process below.
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11.2 Mereological hierarchies as hierarchies of CCCDs
Let us first consider the Chu space C = (Co,C, Ca), where Co and Ca are sets of object tokens and
their corresponding singular categories and C is the “Identifies” relation in Fig. 6. Recall from
§3.1 the pair of maps (α, ω) (there considered as a Galois connection) given by:
α : P(Co) −→ P(Ca) with α(x) = {a : ∀x ∈ X, x C a}
ω : P(Ca) −→ P(Co) with ω(A) = {x : ∀a ∈ A, x C a}.
(11.1)
Here α clearly maps an object token to its (unique) singular category and ω maps a singular
category to its (unique) object token.
Definition 11.1.
(1) Suppose X is a set of subsets consisting of parts of objects. Then we define ω ◦ α(X) to be
the set of subsets of whole parts of objects as obtained from X.
(2) Suppose Y is a set of subsets consisting of parts of attributes. Then we define α ◦ ω(Y ) to be
the set of subsets of whole parts of attributes as obtained from Y .
The usage “whole parts” is employed here to emphasize that “wholes” on one level may be “parts”
at the level(s) above.
Likewise, for a given classification we have A = 〈Tok(A),Typ(A),A〉 , and for a ∈ X ⊆
Typ(A),b ∈ A ⊆ Tok(A), we have:
α∗ : P(Typ(A)) −→ P(Tok(A)) with α∗(x) = {b : ∀a ∈ X, x A b}
ω∗ : P(Tok(A)) −→ P(Typ(A)) with ω∗(A) = {a : ∀b ∈ A, a A b}.
(11.2)
Iterating these conditions allows us to move one rung at a time through the mereological hierarchy
when incorporating information channels.
To see how this mereological hierarchy can be constructed, we first of all construct a (quasi-
hierarchial) complex of CCCDs following §10.2, §10.4 and §10.5. Recalling (10.2), we may view the
index i as indicating a ‘level’ in a complex of CCCDs constructed from connected sequences. In
such sequences, the time intervals will generally be distinct. Thus we commence with families of
time dependent logic infomorphisms arising from such morphisms between different classifications
as specified in (10.2):
Ai[ti1 , tin ] −→ Bj [tj1 , tjn ] (11.3)
at ‘levels’ i, j (possibly j = i), each respecting the ‘parts’ to ‘wholes’ condition of (11.2). Both
classifications lead to their corresponding diagrams as in Fig. 5c, as explained in §10.2, with an
induced (logic) infomorphism Ci −→ Cj between the cocone vertex classifications of the corre-
sponding CCCDs derived from Fig. 5c (again, the time intervals are understood). Following the
formulism of §10.4, we thus obtain induced (logic) infomorphisms:
Dgi[ti1 , tin ] −→ Dgj [tj1 , tjn ]
Ci 7→ Cj
(11.4)
Schematically, this leads to a typical quasi-hierarchial configuration as depicted in Fig. 7 below.
Note that the assumption of taking logic infomorphisms provides an underlying semantic structure
to the various mechanisms as discussed in §9 and §10.
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//
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Fig. 7 : A typical complex of interactive CCCDs corresponding to a mereological object-
token hierarchy that is maintained over time.
Observe that the configurations depicted in Fig. 7 are not strictly hierarchial, even though
the corresponding colimits are iterated. Why it is not strictly hierarchial is plain to see: a part
can be a part of many wholes, and even of wholes at different levels (for instance, an employee
can be part of a division, but also part of a company). As will be seen later, it is in this respect
that a mereotopological complex differs from a standard category-theory hierarchy in the sense of
e.g. Baas, Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch (2004); Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch (2007). Here,
in particular, because of the existence of co-planar complexes and bi-directional arrows (Fig. 8), it
is not always the case that that a relevant object of level n + 1, say, is the colimit of at least one
diagram at level n. However, somewhat in line with Baas, Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch (2004),
we may also interpret an “observer” as an entity that is external or internal to the system, or the
system’s environment itself, through which “selection” induces the further levels of structure.
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“Parts”
“Complexes”
Fig. 8 : A two-layer mereological network with “parts” at the lower level, and “com-
plexes” at the upper level. Each level comprises both tokens and types. For example,
the “complex” level could consist of EL types such as [cat], [dog], [chair], etc. Each
of these has many tokens that are specific individuals. The “part” level can include
visually-identifiable, but non-essential features of these types, such as “has four legs”,
“has fur”, “walks with a gait X”, “is white with brown spots”, etc. Here again there
are tokens: e.g. four particular legs, a particular pattern of white-with-brown spots,
etc.
Lateral connections at each level indicate, e.g. the probable co-occurrence in a scene. Vertical
arrows indicate mereological inclusions going upwards and top-down prediction from current “un-
derstanding” or “prior probabilities” going downwards. These do not necessarily select the same
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relations, as they often do not in real-life situations.
Cocones exist in both directions in this mereological structure: linked (time dependent) colimit
cocones as underlying a typical CCCD, and CCCDs as linked by a network of logic infomorphims
... −→ Ci −→ Ci+1 −→ Ci+2 −→ ... between the cocone vertex classifications.
“Learning” in this system would consist of: 1) associating altogether new lower-and upper-level
types into the network; 2) distinguishing new high-level individuals as clusters of low-level tokens;
3) Convergence toward better predictions (i.e. all vertical arrows are bidirectional). “Building”
in this system is associating a bunch of upward arrows with an upper-level token. “Abstraction”
would be the grouping of upper-level tokens into an upper-level type while preserving all arrows.
Previous work demonstrating general models of ANNs (§7.1) shows that these processes are allowed
in principle; different specific choices of algorithms for these processes would be expected to produce
different hierarchical structures.
11.3 From mereology to mereotopology: Distinguishing objects by boundaries
The detection of edges and their extension into contours that segment an image into bounded,
non-overlapping regions is one of the earliest stages of visual processing (reviewed by Wagemans et
al. (2012a)). What, however, distinguishes a two- or even three-dimensional array of bounded, non-
overlapping pattern elements – e.g. an array of color or texture patches – from an array of bounded,
non-overlapping objects? As discussed above, animacy, agency and independent manipulability
are important indicators of bounded objecthood during infancy and early childhood when object
categories are first being learned and populated with exemplars. What, however, are the inferences
that enforce boundedness for objects, and how does the constraint of having a boundary affect the
informational relations outlined above?
The key idea of mereotopology is that the parts of an object must be inside the object, i.e.
contained within its boundary (Casati and Varzi, 1999; Smith, 1996). This constraint is, clearly,
more easily satisfied for boundaries that are (at least approximately) smooth and convex. As
simplicity and hence resource efficiency appear to be general principles of perceptual system orga-
nization (Wagemans et al., 2012b), one can expect perceivers to “see” smooth, convex boundaries
– e.g. convex hulls of geometrically more complex objects – more easily. Imposing smoothness
and convexity – e.g. by constructing the convex hull of a geometrically more complex object –
is a form of coarse-graining. We can, therefore, suggest that constructing an “exterior” boundary
around a collection of parts that then serves as a boundary for the whole simply is a coarse-graining
operation. In this case, the simplicial methods introduced in §5 immediately become relevant, and
indeed provide a general method of constructing object boundaries from the bottom up in any
mereological hierarchy representable in the CCCD form as in Fig. 7.
As noted earlier, a scene is a mereological complex; segmenting a scene by adding boundaries
makes it a mereotopological complex. At the “top” of the mereotopological hierarchy, a whole scene
can be considered a multilayer complex of simplicial complexes (i.e. identified “whole” objects) of
simplices (identifiable “part” objects). Recall from §5.1 that any such complex, at any level of
the hierarchy, has associated barycentric coordinates and a natural metric. Distances within a
simplicial complex at level n of the hierarchy, however, can also be viewed as distances between its
component simplices at level n− 1. Boundaries, therefore, induce geometric relations between the
bounded objects. In this sense, spatial relations can be viewed as “emergent” from the distinctions
between objects, a view with striking similarities to recent proposals within fundamental physics
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(cf. Fields et al. (2017)).
11.4 Channels, inter-object boundaries and interactions
The spatial separation between objects induced by their boundaries – and hence by their distin-
guishability – generates a time-dependent exchange of information and hence an interaction as this
term is traditionally understood. Again working from the top down in a mereotopological hierarchy
of simplicial complexes indentified with local classifications, every channel between classifications
at level n can also be viewed as a channel between the corresponding “objects”, i.e. simplicial
complexes. This channel corresponds to the boundary between the “objects” if they are adjacent,
i.e. if the corresponding simplicial complexes share (n − 1)-level faces. It is natural to think of
the information transmitted along the channel as “encoded on” this boundary, i.e. as encoded
holographically as this term is used in physics Fields et al. (2017). If the objects are not adjacent,
i.e. if the connecting channel is a composition at level n, the channel can be thought of as passing
through a shared “environment” interposed between the objects. The components of the composed
channel cannot in general be expected to be isomorphisms; hence the structure of this interposed
environment affects the interaction between the objects.
Perceiving object motion requires tracking the identity of the “moving” object through time;
hence it involves a temporal sequence of mereological hierarchies along the lines of Fig. 7. The
structure of the top-level scene is different at each time increment; hence the metric relations be-
tween component simplicial complexes is time-dependent. Changing the relative positions of objects
re-shapes their shared environment, in general altering the interaction between them. The distance
and material, e.g. transparency or electrical permittivity, dependence of physical interactions can,
therefore, be viewed as qualitatively “emergent” from the simplicial structure of classifications.
12 Conclusion
Category theory provides a rich set of tools for investigating relationships between structures, and
hence for representing information flow between structures. These methods have been applied
widely in computer science, and are seeing increasing applications in physics. As we have reviewed
in Part I above, applications of category theoretic methods in the cognitive sciences – mainly in
the investigation of ontologies and ontology convergence – have mainly been carried out at a high
level of abstraction. In Part II, we have begun the process of characterizing object perception in
category-theoretic terms, particularly in terms of Chu spaces, classifications, simplicial complexes,
and local logics. These formal methods provide a natural and intuitively-clear representation per-
ception as a multi-stage process in which types at one level may serve as tokens at a higher level.
The co-cone – cone duality captured in CCCDs is particularly useful as a representation of the
bidirectional information flow employed by the Bayesian predictive coding systems that the brain
appears to implement at multiple scales. The analysis we present in §10 extends previous work on
the representation of ANNs by making this duality explicit. It also makes explicit the essential role
of inferences – here captured as infomorphisms – in tracking object identity through time.
Human beings, and presumably other animals with relative complex cognitive systems, employ
both abstraction and mereological hierarchies to categorize objects. We show in §11 that networks
of time-indexed CCCDs provide a natural representation of the mutually-constraining relationship
between these two categorization methods, particularly as they are employed in object-identity
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tracking. We then explore briefly the emergence of spatial relationships and interactions between
objects from their description as simplicial complexes embedded in the larger simplicial complex
that constitutes a perceptual scene. This top-down, emergence-based approach to mereotopology
differs significantly from previous approaches that are geared to different priorities, and different
applications (Leˆ and Janicki, 2008; Smith, 1996).
This initial foray into the categorical representation of cognitive processes raises a number of
questions and illuminates several open problems. One of the deepest is whether the satisfaction
relations  operating between tokens and types at any of the processing levels considered here
are well-defined. While it must be assumed that they are to develop models, and associations,
it remains possible that “” is token, type, context, or time dependent, as studies of the depen-
dence of language on unspecified “background knowledge” (Searle, 1983) or of cognition generally
on “embodiment” (Anderson, 2003; Chemero, 2013) suggest. Problems that require further work
include the implications of the present results for the representation of ontologies and particularly
for ontology convergence between agents that have encountered non- or only partially-overlapping
collections of individual objects, the extent to which local logics define or constrain semantic re-
lations between either tokens or types, the extent to which cognitively-significant differences in
spatial scale can be captured by coarse-graining, and the question of why the geometry emergent
from human visual perception should be three-dimensional. There also remains the open question
of how cognition is affected when one or the other of the categorization systems breaks down, as
appears to be the case with the mereological system in autism where a sense of context, and an
overall gestalt of certain situations may be adversely impacted (Happe´ and Frith, 2006). It is,
finally, possible that the conceptual ground which we have covered could be further supplemented
by certain related techniques of higher dimensional algebra (Brown, Higgins and Sivera, 2011) and
those of n-categories (Leinster, 2004), topics which remain for further investigation.
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